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A curious relationship currently exists between collateral
consequences and criminal procedures. It is now widely
accepted that collateral consequences are an integral
component of the American criminal justice system. Such
consequences shape the contours of many criminal cases,
influencing what charges are brought by the government, the
content of plea negotiations, the sentences imposed by trial
judges, and the impact of criminal convictions on defendants.
Yet, when it comes to the allocation of criminal procedures,
collateral consequences continue to be treated as if they are
external to the criminal justice process. Specifically, a
conviction’s collateral consequences, no matter how severe,
are typically treated as irrelevant when determining whether
a defendant is entitled to a particular procedural protection.
This Article examines that paradoxical relationship and,
after identifying a previously overlooked reason for its
existence, provides a framework for incorporating collateral
consequences into criminal procedure. Heavily influenced by
concerns of practicality and feasibility, the proposed
methodology establishes a theoretically coherent path
forward that requires only modest adjustments to existing
doctrines. After setting forth the three-step framework, the
Article applies its insights to the two most hallowed rights in
our criminal justice system: the constitutional right to counsel
and the constitutional right to a jury trial.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Collateral consequences of conviction have recently received
extensive attention from the legal profession1 and legal academy.2
And rightly so. Collateral consequences—which include sanctions
like removal from the United States,3 sex offender registration,4
firearm prohibitions,5 and disqualifications from public benefits6—
are frequently the most important result of a criminal conviction.
Collateral consequences impact, often deeply, the lives of millions of
criminal defendants each year.7 Such collateral consequences also
shape the contours of many criminal cases, influencing what charges
are brought by the government, the content of plea negotiations
between prosecutors and defense counsel, and sentences imposed by

1. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010); UNIF.
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL
SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS
§ 19-1.1–1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed. 2004).
2. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance
of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 718–
19 (2002); Gabriel J. Chin, What Are Defense Lawyers For? Links Between
Collateral Consequences and the Criminal Process, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 151, 155
(2012); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences
of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated
Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 624–25 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, An
Integrated Perspective]; Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry
and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 (2010)
[hereinafter Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives]; Jenny Roberts, The Mythical
Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions:
Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670,
672 (2008).
3. Chin, supra note 2.
4. Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives, supra note 2.
5. Chin, supra note 2, at 159–60.
6. Id. at 155.
7. Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences,
Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 126–
128 (2009).
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trial judges.8 In short, collateral consequences are an integral
component of the American criminal justice system.
But collateral consequences remain on the outside of the criminal
justice process in one critical respect: a conviction’s collateral
consequences, no matter how severe, are typically treated as
irrelevant when determining whether a defendant is entitled to a
particular procedural protection. Several important procedural
entitlements are allocated only to some criminal defendants. For
example, only some criminal defendants receive the right to counsel,
the right to a jury trial, the right to a preliminary hearing, the right
to a grand jury, or the right to heightened levels of discovery.9 And
the determination of whether a defendant receives any one of these
protections is based solely on a single sanction—imprisonment.10 In
other words, when it comes to deciding how to distribute procedural
entitlements to criminal defendants, potential collateral
consequences of conviction are rarely, if ever, considered. In this
respect, collateral consequences continue to be treated as if they are
external to the criminal justice process—an approach that not only
blinks reality but also has the pernicious effect of depriving
defendants facing severe sanctions from procedures designed to
increase accuracy and fairness.
The persistence of this paradox—that collateral consequences are
integral to the criminal justice system but are peripheral to the
allocation of procedural entitlements—presents something of a
puzzle. If collateral consequences have been widely recognized as
critically important to those processed through the criminal justice
system and to those processing the system, why do such consequences
continue to remain unaccounted for when distributing procedural
entitlements to criminal defendants?
This question, and the
relationship between collateral consequences and procedural
entitlements more generally, has received sparingly little attention
from the academy. While the impact collateral consequences have on
criminal defendants post-conviction has received thorough scrutiny
from scholars,11 the potential impact of collateral consequences on the
front-end of the criminal justice process—namely, how collateral

8. See infra Subpart III.B.
9. Many criminal defendants do not receive most or even any of these
procedural protections. For more, see infra Part II.
10. Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 808
(2016).
11. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153,
154–55 (1999); Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2; Jeremy Travis,
Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 15–16
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
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consequences intersect with procedural entitlements—has been
largely overlooked.12
This Article’s first contribution is identifying a thus far
underappreciated reason for why courts and legislatures have failed
to incorporate collateral consequences into the allocation of criminal
procedures: incorporating collateral consequences requires courts and
legislatures to engage in difficult line-drawing decisions given the
various incommensurability issues raised by collateral consequences,
thereby discouraging them from undertaking the project in the first
place.
More specifically, several significant conceptual and practical
questions arise once one looks beyond imprisonment when deciding
how to allocate procedural protections across defendants. For
example, should all potential collateral consequences be considered,
or only some? What about collateral consequences that are imposed
by another sovereign—like federal collateral consequences that flow
from a state conviction? What about collateral consequences that are
ultimately imposed at the discretion of an administrative body—like
ineligibility for certain public welfare benefits or other forms of
financial assistance? What about collateral consequences that do not
uniformly apply to all defendants—like immigration consequences
that apply only to noncitizens? And what makes a potential collateral
consequence, or constellation of consequences, sufficiently severe so
as to warrant heightened procedural protections?
The few courts to have considered some of these important
questions have struggled to produce coherent, let alone consistent,
answers. Courts have not only reached conflicting results,13 but those
12. To the extent there has been a discussion about collateral consequences
and procedural rights, the focus has been on what advice defense counsel must
provide their clients. See, e.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note 2; Roberts, supra note
7, at 148–49; Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and
Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 678 (2011); Chin, supra
note 2, at 156–58; Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J.
693, 719–20 (2011). This scholarly focus on advice by defense counsel is
unsurprising given the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010),
which now requires counsel to advise defendants on potential immigration
consequences prior to pleading guilty. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
359–60 (2010).
13. For example, a recent division of authority involves whether a defendant
subject to removal from the United States upon conviction is constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, for instance,
recently became the first court to hold that a defendant facing deportation does
have the right to demand a jury trial. See Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243,
1246–47 (D.C. 2018). The New York Court of Appeals soon followed suit, also
holding that a defendant facing deportation is entitled a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment. See People v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168, 172 (N.Y. 2018). In reaching
these conclusions, the D.C. and New York high courts diverged from courts like
the Nevada Supreme Court, which held that defendants facing deportation upon
conviction do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial. See Amezcua v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 319 P.3d 602, 605 (Nev. 2014).
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courts that arrive at the same conclusion often give competing
rationales for their respective decisions.14 And no court has sought to
establish a comprehensive approach to incorporating collateral
consequences, instead focusing on the specific consequence and
particular procedure before them in a given case.
The academy also has largely eschewed the enterprise of
incorporating collateral consequences into criminal procedure, and
the few scholars and commentators to have examined the intersection
of collateral consequences and criminal procedures have done so in
fairly limited ways. Some scholars, for example, have focused on a
single collateral consequence (immigration) and single procedural
entitlement (right to counsel).15 Others have argued for the universal

In the context of whether a defendant facing the threat of sex offender
registration is entitled to a jury trial, all but one court to consider the issue has
said “no.” See, e.g., Ivy v. United States, No. 5:08-CR-00021-TBR, 2010 WL
1257729, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2010); Rauch v. United States, No. 1:07-CV0730 WMW, 2007 WL 2900181, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007); Thomas v.
United States, 942 A.2d 1180, 1186 (D.C. 2008); People v. Danthuluri, 923
N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. App. Term 2011). But see Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536,
540, 543–44 (Ariz. 2008) (holding that a defendant facing sex offender
registration is entitled to a jury trial under state constitution because that
collateral consequence (1) “ar[o]se directly from statutory Arizona law”; (2) is
“severe”; and (3) applies “uniformly to all persons convicted of a particular
offense”).
In the context of firearm prohibitions, courts have similarly rejected arguments
for heightened procedures with regularity. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 204
F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We hold that the prohibition of firearm
possession by persons convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is
not so serious as to entitle them to a jury trial for a presumptively petty offense.”);
United States v. Jardee, No. 4:09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242, at *4 (D.N.D. Feb.
12, 2010); United States v. Combs, No. 8:05CR271, 2005 WL 3262983, at *3 (D.
Neb. Dec. 1, 2005); Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 605. But see United States v. Smith,
151 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1318 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (finding that a lifetime ban on
firearm possession warrants affording the defendant a right to a jury trial).
14. Compare Amezcua, 319 P.3d at 605 (rejecting claim that the threat of
deportation entitled a defendant to a jury trial because it arises out of federal
law, not Nevada law), with Fretes-Zarate v. United States, 40 A.3d 374, 378–79
(D.C. 2012) (rejecting claim that the threat of deportation entitled defendant to a
jury trial because that collateral penalty was not one “the trial judge had the
authority to impose” and was a “hypothetical penalt[y] that could arise only in
separate civil and administrative proceedings”).
15. A thoughtful piece on this score is Alice Clapman’s Petty Offenses, Drastic
Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen
Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585 (2011). In that article,
Clapman argues that “Padilla has implications beyond the scope of a defense
attorney’s obligations to his client, and specifically that it supports a reexamination of the now-classical rule that defendants who do not face
incarceration have no right to counsel, at least to the extent of expanding that
rule to include deportation.” Id. at 617–18. Notably, Clapman’s article only
examines whether the right to counsel should be expanded for defendants facing
potential immigration consequences. She does not explore other procedural
entitlements or other collateral consequences.
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expansion of the right to counsel given the increased prevalence of
collateral consequences generally.16 But none have charted a
comprehensive course for incorporating collateral consequences into
criminal procedure.
In a previous work, I argued that collateral consequences should
be accounted for when allocating criminal procedural entitlements
and gave several reasons why that should happen, but left for another
day the difficult question of how to incorporate collateral
consequences into criminal procedure.17 This Article now tackles that
important question and, in so doing, explains how courts and
legislatures can incorporate collateral consequences into the
allocation of criminal procedural entitlements.
This Article’s core contribution is providing a framework for
incorporating collateral consequences into criminal procedures—a
framework that is theoretically coherent, practically feasible, and
requires only modest adjustments to existing doctrines.
My
methodology also alleviates concerns about incommensurability and
establishes a path forward that aligns the allocation of procedural
entitlements with the fact that collateral consequences are often the
most significant sanction of a criminal case. Put simply, the current
distribution of procedural entitlements is based on an outdated
model, where imprisonment is treated as the only significant sanction
imposed upon conviction. That antiquated approach—and the
harmful effects it creates—should be cast aside, and this Article
provides a roadmap for doing so.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II details the curious
relationship that currently exists between collateral consequences
and criminal procedures and explains why collateral consequences
continue to remain unaccounted for in the distribution of procedural
entitlements.

Other scholars have similarly focused solely on immigration when
considering the potential expansion of procedural protections. See, e.g., Orrie A.
Levy, Due Process and the Post-Padilla Landscape: Balancing the Severity of
Deportation as a Collateral Consequence with a Court’s Traditionally Narrow
Obligation in Accepting a Plea, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 41 (2012)
(examining whether, after Padilla v. Kentucky, trial courts should inform a
defendant of potential immigration consequences before accepting a guilty plea).
16. See, e.g., John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to
Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 1, 34 (2013); Paul Marcus, Why the United
States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a Lot) of the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 189 (2009). But these articles
do not attempt to incorporate collateral consequences into criminal procedure;
they instead seek to dramatically expand one procedural entitlement (the right
to counsel) in part because of the rise of collateral consequences of conviction.
17. See Crane, supra note 10, at 829–31 (describing the salutary effects
incorporation of collateral consequences would have on the criminal justice
system). In fact, I explicitly left unanswered several key questions about
incorporation that this Article now takes up. See id. at 832–33.
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Part III, which represents the heart of the Article, sets forth a
three-step framework for incorporating collateral consequences into
criminal procedure. The first step is ascertaining the theory of
allocation underlying the right at issue. Under my approach, each
procedural entitlement is examined individually—it is a
right-by-right inquiry. And the first step is identifying not only the
line dividing those defendants who receive a particular right from
those who do not but also the rationale for that dividing line. That
rationale will then inform how collateral consequences can be
incorporated in a way that is consistent within and across existing
doctrines.
The second step is determining which collateral consequences are
eligible for potentially triggering the right at issue. As explained in
more detail below, not every collateral consequence should be
considered for each entitlement.
Rather, some collateral
consequences should be excluded from consideration for a given right
based on the allocation theory developed in step one. In order to
facilitate this step, I categorize collateral consequences along three
different dimensions: whether the consequence is automatically
imposed upon conviction, whether it is imposed by the same sovereign
prosecuting the offense, and whether it applies uniformly to all
defendants charged with a particular offense.18 By untangling the
complexities of collateral consequences in this way, courts and
legislatures will now have a handy guide for determining which
collateral consequences should be considered and which should be
excluded at step three.
The third and final step is deciding whether an eligible collateral
consequence is sufficiently severe to trigger the procedural
entitlement at issue. The main contribution here is the development
of a rubric for assessing the relative severity of collateral
consequences in terms of functional equivalent of prison time.19
Because existing doctrines distribute procedural entitlements based
on the metric of imprisonment, I offer a way for grading collateral
consequences consistent with that metric, thereby easing concerns
about incommensurability and slippery slopes.
After setting forth my proposed framework, I then apply its
insights to the two most hallowed rights in our criminal justice
system: the constitutional right to counsel (Part IV) and the
constitutional right to a jury trial (Part V). These applications
demonstrate how my methodology for incorporating collateral
consequences can be applied in practice, providing courts and
legislatures with a model for the incorporation of other rights that are
distributed unevenly across defendants, such as the right to a
preliminary hearing, to a grand jury, and to heightened discovery
from the government.
18. See infra Subpart IV.B.
19. See infra Subpart IV.C.
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II. THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURES
This Part details the curious relationship that currently exists
between collateral consequences and procedural entitlements.
Subpart A provides some basic background about collateral
consequences—what they are and how they are triggered by criminal
convictions. For ease of exposition, this Article focuses on four leading
collateral consequences: immigration consequences, sex offender
registration and notification requirements, firearm prohibitions, and
disqualifications from public benefits.
Subpart B describes how collateral consequences are deeply
enmeshed in the criminal justice system, including the ways in which
they impact and influence defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors,
and judges. It also explains that, despite the degree to which
collateral consequences are intertwined with the criminal justice
system, they are not integrated into the determination of which
procedural entitlements a defendant receives.
Subpart C then posits that a primary reason why courts and
legislatures have thus far declined to consider collateral consequences
when allocating procedural entitlements is because of the
line-drawing difficulties and incommensurability issues raised by the
prospect of incorporating collateral consequences into criminal
procedure—the precise complications this Article seeks to ameliorate.
A.

Understanding Collateral Consequences

The legal consequences that flow from a criminal conviction are
typically divided into two groups: direct and collateral.20 Direct
consequences are those sanctions that fall “within the sentencing
authority of the state [or federal] trial court.”21 They include the
20. See Roberts, supra note 2, at 678. Criminal convictions also have
significant nonlegal consequences, including adverse effects on private
employment prospects and various forms of social stigma. See John Bronsteen et
al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1049–54 (2009). See
generally Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV.
1103 (2013) (describing the growing concern over collateral consequences to
criminal convictions); Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2 at 624–25
n.1 (2006) (listing many sources that address this issue); Travis, supra note 11
(describing the various negative impacts of collateral consequences on multiple
types of offenders). Although the term “collateral consequences” has occasionally
been used to refer to nonlegal consequences, my use of the phrase is limited to a
conviction’s legally-imposed consequences. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL.,
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE § 1:8 (2016).
21. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364. Commentators have similarly emphasized the
role and authority of the sentencing court when attempting to delineate the realm
of collateral consequences. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 20 (“[W]e endorse
‘collateral consequences’ as a generally serviceable (if not entirely precise) term
to describe the range of legal penalties and disabilities that flow from a criminal
conviction over and above the sentence imposed by the court.”).
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punishments most often associated with criminal convictions—
sanctions such as imprisonment, fines, and probation.22 A collateral
consequence, by contrast, is any sanction or disability imposed by law
as a result of a criminal conviction that is in addition to the
conviction’s direct consequences.23
In other words, collateral
consequences “are not part of the explicit punishment handed down
by the court; they stem from the fact of conviction rather than from
the sentence of the court.”24
While there are scores of various collateral consequences that
might flow from a criminal conviction,25 this Article, for ease of
explication, focuses on four types of collateral consequences: (1)
immigration consequences; (2) sanctions imposed on sex offenders; (3)
firearm prohibitions; and (4) disqualification from various public
benefits, such as public housing, food assistance, and other forms of
financial aid. I focus on these four categories for several reasons. To
begin, each of these consequences can have a significant impact on a
defendant—and when imposed is often the most important result of
a criminal conviction.26 In addition, each of these consequences
applies to a large number of individuals every year; these are not
consequences suffered by a trivial few.27 Finally, each of these
consequences can flow from a conviction for a misdemeanor offense.
A defendant charged and convicted of a misdemeanor receives fewer
procedural entitlements than his or her felony counterpart,28 and
under existing law that procedural disparity persists even if the
misdemeanor defendant faces one of these significant collateral
consequences. Each of these four types of consequences will be
discussed in turn.
1.

Immigration Consequences

The laws governing deportation were largely overhauled in the
1990s.29 Among other things, Congress “increased the number of
22. Roberts, supra note 2, at 680.
23. See, e.g., Court Security Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-177,
§ 510(d), 121 Stat. 2534, 2544 (2008); UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTION ACT § 2(1)–(2) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
2010).
24. Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2, at 634.
25. See National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUST.
CTR: THE COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ (last visited
Feb. 6, 2019).
26. See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 (“[D]eportation is an integral part—
indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed
on noncitizen defendants . . . .”).
27. Crane, supra note 10, at 785, 790–93.
28. Id. at 802.
29. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; Immigration Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050. Congress first made certain
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crimes triggering deportation.”30 Most relevant here, Congress
significantly expanded the number of misdemeanor offenses that
render a noncitizen deportable.31 For example, Congress made a
conviction for any offense “relating to a controlled substance” (subject
to one narrow exception involving minor marijuana possession)
grounds for deportation.32 Congress likewise made a wide swath of
offenses involving domestic violence and child abuse, including
misdemeanor offenses under state law, grounds for deportation.33 As
a result, a large number of “misdemeanors—a category of crimes
where those convicted often serve no jail time—can lead to removal,”34
meaning many “noncitizens are subject to the severe penalty of
deportation even for convictions for minor crimes.”35
While a criminal conviction for a qualifying offense renders the
noncitizen defendant deportable, the process of removal—and
whether the defendant is in fact removed—takes place outside the
criminal justice system.36 Removal proceedings, which are civil in
nature, are initiated at the discretion of the Department of Homeland
Security, and the removal proceeding is overseen by an immigration
judge appointed by the Attorney General.37 The immigration judge
determines whether the defendant has violated a provision of the
immigration laws and, if so, whether he or she should be ordered

criminal convictions a basis for deportation in 1917. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361
(describing the enactment of The Immigration Act of 1917).
30. See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1411, 1444 n.93 (2005); see also Juliet Stumpf, Fitting
Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1722–25 (2009) (exemplifying specific
examples of crimes that result in deportation).
31. See Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1758–63 (2012); Clapman, supra
note 15, at 591; Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CAL. L. REV. 553,
560–61 (2013). Congress also eliminated most statutory forms of relief and
abolished a sentencing court’s ability to prevent deportation through a procedure
known as a “judicial recommendation against deportation.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at
361–64; see also Mikos, supra note 30 (“These amendments . . . eliminated most
statutory means of relief.”).
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368;
Cade, supra note 28, at 1760.
33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
34. Lee, supra note 31, at 561.
35. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 2:47 n.6. Indeed, many removals are in fact
based on misdemeanor convictions. See, e.g., Heidi Altman, Prosecuting
Post-Padilla: State Interests and the Pursuit of Justice for Noncitizen, 101 GEO.
L.J. 1, 14 (2012).
36. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (explaining that “removal proceedings are civil
in nature”).
37. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, §2:48 (“DHS is in charge of immigration
benefits such as work visas and gaining citizenship, the enforcement of
immigration laws, and border security among other matters.”).
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removed from the United States.38 In so doing, the immigration judge
may consider various forms of discretionary relief—but only if such
relief is available under federal law.39 Most noncitizens convicted of
a criminal offense rendering them deportable are ineligible for such
discretionary relief.40
Accordingly, as the Supreme Court
summarized in Padilla v. Kentucky,41 “[u]nder contemporary law, if a
non-citizen has committed a removable offense . . . his removal is
practically inevitable.”42
Immigration law is famously complex, and I do not mean to skirt
some of those complexities with my brief discussion here.43 Rather,
for purposes of this Article, the bottom line when it comes to
immigration consequences is straightforward: many minor offenses,
including offenses where the defendant faces little or no jail time, can
render a noncitizen deportable from the United States upon his or her
conviction. And, under existing law, his or her eventual removal from
the United States, through a civil process distinct from the criminal
justice system, will often be “practically inevitable” after a conviction
for a deportable offense.44
2.

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Requirements

Another type of significant collateral consequence is that imposed
on convicted sex offenders. All fifty states, the District of Columbia,
and the federal government have laws requiring convicted sex
offenders to “register with the police upon release from prison” and
laws establishing community notification systems, such as ones
through the Internet, about registered sex offenders.45 And, critically

38. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2012) (“At the conclusion of the proceeding
the immigration judge shall decide whether an alien is removable from the
United States.”).
39. See Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
611, 616 (2005).
40. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364.
41. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
42. Id. at 363–64.
43. For more in-depth treatment of the immigration consequences of
criminal convictions, see the sources collected by Love and her coauthors. LOVE
ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 2:47–2:59.
44. Padilla, 599 U.S. at 363–64.
45. Travis, supra note 11, at 22; see Kevin G. Buckler & Lawrence F. Travis
III, Reanalyzing the Prevalence and Social Context of Collateral Consequence
Statutes, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 435, 443 (2003); Lori McPherson, The Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) at 10 Years: History, Implementation,
and the Future, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 741, 747 n.16 (2016). Much like immigration,
the 1990s was a defining period for sex offender registration and notification
requirements. In 1986, only four states had laws requiring certain sex offenders
to register; by 1998, all jurisdictions had such laws. Buckler & Travis, supra note
45, at 443; Travis, supra note 11, at 21–22; see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 20,
§2:39 (“While registration and community notification laws, often known
eponymously by the names of child victims sparking their enactment, originated
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for purposes of this Article, the vast majority of jurisdictions include
some misdemeanors in their lists of registerable offenses.46 In
addition, sex offender registration and notification requirements
typically apply automatically upon conviction of a registerable
offense, as defined by the pertinent jurisdiction.47 Registration and
notification periods range from fifteen years to life, depending on the
jurisdiction and qualifying offense.48
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) is
the guiding federal legislation for sex offender registration and
notification laws.49 SORNA is not mandatory on the states, but there
are substantial penalties for noncompliance.50 SORNA sets minimum
standards for sex offender registration and notification laws adopted
by the states, and thus provides a representative example of the types
of requirements imposed on convicted sex offenders across the
country. For example, pursuant to SORNA, a sex offender must
provide his or her name, Social Security number, license plate
numbers, descriptions of his or her vehicles, and the address of his or
her residence to the registering jurisdiction.51 Offenders must also
provide the name and address of any place he or she is employed or is
enrolled as a student,52 and he or she must provide information about

only in the early- to mid-1990s, they today affect hundreds of thousands of
individuals nationwide.”).
46. See King, supra note 16, at 28; Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors
Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 277, 298–99 (2011); see also, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a (McKinney
2011) (listing five misdemeanors as registerable offenses).
47. See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification
Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 885, 889 (1995).
48. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of
Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071,
1087 (2012) (“Today, a tier I offender [the least serious offender] generally must
register for a minimum of fifteen years or, often, twenty years. Additionally,
many more crimes today have been assigned lifetime registration or recast to
require lifetime registration.”). Pursuant to SORNA, offenders are sorted into
tiers based on the offense of conviction. Tier I offenders have a full registration
period of fifteen years. Tier II and III offenders have a full registration period of
twenty-five years and life, respectively. The registration periods can be reduced
for Tier II and Tier III offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16915(a) (2012).
49. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109248, 120 Stat. 587. For a detailed explanation of the history of sex offender
registration laws, see generally McPherson, supra note 45 (discussing the
ramifications of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 16912(a)–(b). States that have not implemented SORNA
provisions within the specified timetable forfeit ten percent of the funds normally
allocated to them under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
However, noncompliance is excused if the state acted in good faith to implement
the program. 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) (“[A] jurisdiction that fails . . . to substantially
implement this subchapter shall not receive ten percent of the funds that would
otherwise be allocated for that fiscal year to the jurisdiction . . . .”).
51. Id. § 16914(a).
52. Id.
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any travel outside of the United States.53 Offenders must also
regularly update this information if any changes occur,54 and he or
she must also appear in person for a new photograph and to verify
information every three months to one year, depending on their
classification status.55
As for the “notification” aspect of sex offender laws, much of the
information collected during the registration process is made publicly
available via the Internet.56 For example, a website run by the federal
government allows users to enter a zip code or geographical region
and obtain “relevant information,” which includes the offender’s
name, addresses of his or her residence and employment, a physical
description, offenses, and a photograph.57 Each state has its own
similar website and notification methods, containing similar and
sometimes more detailed information about registered sex
offenders.58
Conviction for a registerable sex offense also triggers related
consequences involving residential restrictions, such as prohibitions
on living within a certain distance of a school or any place where
children may congregate, and restrictions on potential employment.59
“[S]everal dozen states,” moreover, “have started using global

53. Information Required for Notice of International Travel, OFF. OF SEX
OFFENDER, SENT’G, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING, AND TRACKING,
https://smart.gov/international_travel.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2019); see LOVE ET
AL., supra note 20, § 2:39 (“Registrants must provide authorities with a
considerable of amount of information. . . .”).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(c) (2012) (requiring a registrant to update their
information within three days of a change of name, address, employment, or
student status, and requires the person to appear in at least one of the
jurisdictions).
55. Id. § 16916. The periods are as follows: every year for Tier I offenders,
six months for Tier II offenders, and every three months for Tier III offenders.
SORNA also requires states to implement a criminal penalty for offenders who
fail to comply with the registration requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(e). In
addition, an offender who “knowingly fails to register or update a registration as
required” can be charged with a federal offense that authorizes up to ten years of
imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(3) (2012).
56. See 34 U.S.C. § 20921 (2012) (requiring the attorney general to maintain
a national database of all sex offenders); National Sex Offender Search, NSOPW,
https://www.nsopw.gov/en/search/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
57. See National Sex Offender Search, supra note 56.
58. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Sex Offender Search, MEGAN’S L. WEBSITE,
https://www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (allowing users
to search for registered sex offenders in Pennsylvania and providing their name,
address, height, weight, race, birth year, identifying marks, and offense
committed).
59. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 2:43; see also Wayne A. Logan,
Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 6–7, 13–14 (2006) (noting that at least eighteen states restrict
registered sex offenders from living within a certain distance of schools, usually
between 500 and 2,000 feet).
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positioning satellite (GPS) or other tracking technology to monitor sex
offenders after their release from confinement.”60
In sum, a defendant convicted of a qualifying sex offense,
including a qualifying misdemeanor offense, will automatically upon
conviction be subjected to a suite of significant collateral
consequences involving registration requirements, community
notification, residential and employment restrictions, and potential
government monitoring by GPS.
3.

Firearm Prohibitions

Congress first forbade the possession of firearms by certain
criminal offenders in 1938,61 and eventually prohibited all felons from
possessing a firearm in 1968.62 It did not limit the ability of
misdemeanants to possess firearms, however, until 1996.63 Congress
made it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” to purchase or possess
a firearm that has travelled in interstate commerce.64 In addition to
the federal ban, fifteen states and the District of Columbia currently
prohibit the possession of firearms by persons convicted of
misdemeanor domestic violence offenses.65 Firearm prohibitions
60. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 2:44 (“While most laws are limited in their
application to probation and parole periods, several subject sex offenders to
lifetime electronic monitoring and require reimbursement of monitoring costs.”);
see also Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 48, at 1098–99 (noting that GPS
monitoring is a recent addition to registration schemes that allows law
enforcement to track sex offenders after release from confinement).
61. See Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938);
Conrad Kahn, Challenging the Federal Prohibition on Gun Possession by
Nonviolent Felons, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 113, 113–14 (2013).
62. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, 82 Stat. 197; Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213; see
also C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun? 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 695, 698 (2009).
63. See Mikos, supra note 30, at 1457 n.153 (discussing Congress’s desire to
prevent gun possession by misdemeanor domestic violence offenders).
64. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); see also
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) (2012) (defining a “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” to include state and federal misdemeanor offenses).
Under federal law, the definition of a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence’ is complex. A qualifying conviction must involve an offense
that “is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law” and that
“has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or
has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”
LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 2:30 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)).
65. See Domestic Violence & Firearms, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE, http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-firearms-policy-summary/
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typically apply automatically and immediately upon conviction of a
qualifying offense; there is no separate administrative process
required to implement this collateral consequence of conviction.66
4.

Disqualification from Public Benefits

Criminal convictions can preclude a defendant from accessing a
wide range of public benefits. As Brian Murray has summarized,
“[c]onvictions can lead to ineligibility for unemployment benefits, loss
of retirement benefits for public officials, and disqualification from
welfare, cash assistance, and medical assistance. They also can result
in forcible eviction from public housing, and the inability to live with
someone, related or unrelated, who is seeking child custody.”67 These
consequences can be imposed under state or federal law, and many
can be triggered by a misdemeanor conviction.68
For example, with respect to public housing benefits, the landlord
or relevant public housing agency can terminate a person’s lease for
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants, any
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of their residences by persons residing in
the immediate vicinity of the premises, or any drug-related
criminal activity on or near such premises, engaged in by a
tenant of any unit, any member of the tenant’s household, or
any guest or other person under the tenant’s control.69

(last visited Feb. 6, 2019). Several states have enacted bans where a
misdemeanor offense triggers a period of prohibition on firearm possession. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.713 (West 2016) (prohibition for three years in cases
of crimes of violence or where a person has been convicted at the “gross
misdemeanor level”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(5) (McKinney 2013) (prohibition,
for five years, on possessing a firearm outside the home or place of business after
conviction of a class A misdemeanor).
66. AM. BAR ASS’N, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS:
JUDICIAL BENCH BOOK 6–7 (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants
/251583.pdf.
67. Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel: Increasing Notice of
Collateral Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1153–54 (2015); see also LOVE
ET AL., supra note 20, §2:18 (“Conviction can lead to loss of welfare benefits under
both state and federal law. The most common programs affected by conviction
are the federally funded but state-administered Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).
TANF provides temporary financial assistance to pregnant women and to
families with children. TANF funds can assist recipients in paying for housing,
food, and utilities. SNAP, also known as the food stamp program, provides
subsidies to low-income individuals and families to purchase food.”).
68. See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE § 1109.92(c)(1) (2015) (providing that persons
convicted of a first-degree felony forfeit their right to public medical benefits for
any period of incarceration).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2012). For the purposes of this Section,
drug-related criminal activity refers to “the illegal manufacture, sale,
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With respect to medical assistance (e.g., Medicare), a person can be
denied access to medical benefit programs for any “criminal offense
consisting of a misdemeanor relating to fraud, theft, embezzlement,
breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial misconduct” or
for any “criminal offense consisting of a misdemeanor relating to the
unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a
controlled substance.”70
The loss of such public benefits does not typically apply
automatically after a pertinent criminal conviction, but rather
depends on the implementation and discretion of some public
administrative body—such as a public housing authority or relevant
health care agency.71
B. The Curious Relationship Between Collateral Consequences and
Criminal Procedural Entitlements
1. The Relevance of Collateral Consequences to Criminal
Justice
Collateral consequences are an integral part of the American
criminal justice system. As explained above, criminal convictions can
trigger numerous and significant collateral consequences. But that is
just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the impact collateral
consequences have on the criminal justice system. Collateral
consequences affect many parties to the criminal justice process—
defendants most of all, but also defense attorneys, prosecutors, and
judges. Collateral consequences also influence many aspects of the
criminal justice process, including charging decisions, plea
bargaining, and sentencing.

distribution, use, or possession with intent to manufacture, sell, distribute, or use
a controlled substance.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(5).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(a)(4), (b)(1) (2012).
71. See, e.g., LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 2:17–2:18. A similar set of
collateral consequences relate to occupational and professional licenses. A
panoply of state and federal laws prohibits persons with certain qualifying
convictions, including convictions for some misdemeanor offenses, from being
employed in a wide variety of fields—everything from barbers to bank tellers.
Similarly,
[v]arious occupations with [state] licensing boards are given broad
discretion to refuse licenses to an applicant with a felony or
misdemeanor conviction. These same boards are often required by law
to consider convictions and sometimes are prohibited from issuing a
license to individuals with certain convictions, irrespective of that
individual’s rehabilitation post-conviction or the underlying facts in the
case.
Murray, supra note 67, at 1150–51 (citations omitted). Some of the prohibitions
are mandatory; some are discretionary. But the bottom line is the same: a
conviction, including conviction for a misdemeanor offense, can result in the
defendant being prohibited from his or her occupational field.
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With respect to defendants, collateral consequences are typically
the most important result of a criminal conviction.72 This is because
collateral consequences of conviction “are frequently more punitive
and long-lasting than court-imposed sanctions like a prison term or
fine.”73 And this will be true for most defendants processed through
the criminal justice system: “[F]or most people convicted of crimes,
collateral consequences will generate the most significant effects.”74
This reality—that collateral consequences are usually the most
important part of any criminal conviction—has a ripple effect on
nearly every other corner of the criminal justice process.
For example, as a wide and still burgeoning literature recognizes,
a primary role and responsibility of a defense attorney is to advise his
or her client about collateral consequences and assist that client in
navigating such consequences.75 “[C]ompetent defense lawyers must
now be informed about the range of collateral consequences
potentially affecting their clients, be prepared to bargain with the
prosecutor about them, seek to shape the disposition of the case
around them, and advise the client about how to mitigate them after
judgment.”76 Indeed, “[c]onsideration of the full range of [collateral]
72. See Chin, supra note 2, at 152, 154 (“[C]ollateral consequences, not fine
or imprisonment, are the most significant consequences in criminal cases.”); see
also Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 700 (“The real work of the conviction is
performed by the collateral consequences.”); Robert M. A. Johnson, A Prosecutor’s
Expanded Responsibilities Under Padilla, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 132
(2011) (“The civil consequences of a criminal conviction are often far greater than
any consequence imposed by a judge at sentencing.”).
73. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 1:2; Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 699–
700 (observing that, in most criminal cases, “[t]he collateral consequences are a
far more meaningful result of such a conviction” and that “traditional sanctions
such as fine or imprisonment are comparatively insignificant”); Crane, supra note
10, at 779 (“Although incarceration terms for low-level convictions typically top
out at a couple of months—and rarely more than a few years—several key
collateral consequences last for decades or even life.”).
74. Chin, supra note 2, at 154.
75. See, e.g., McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not A Bad Word: A Criminal
Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy
Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 497 (2005) [hereinafter Smyth, Not a Bad Word]
(explaining that defense attorneys are required to inform their clients about the
effects of “hidden sanctions” and collateral consequences before accepting a guilty
plea); see also Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating
Collateral Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1072–76, 1078, 1080 (2004) (arguing that the “holistic
approach” to defense representation has overlooked collateral consequences and
it must incorporate collateral consequences in order to truly be effective);
McGregor Smyth, “Collateral” No More: The Practical Imperative for Holistic
Defense in a Post-Padilla World . . . Or, How to Achieve Consistently Better Results
for Clients, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 139, 141–42, 144 (2011) [hereinafter
Smyth, “Collateral” No More] (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of defense counsel informing their clients of potential collateral
consequences when deciding on accepting a plea).
76. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 1:15; see, e.g., Chin, supra note 14, at 689
(“The only stable principle is that counsel must strive to advise about all
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consequences for clients and their families should be a critical part of
defense inquiry and strategy at every stage of representation, from the
first client meeting to sentencing.”77
Collateral consequences also have a significant influence on
prosecutors, particularly in relatively low-level cases (that is, cases
involving misdemeanors and low-grade felonies). In some such cases
prosecutors will charge particular offenses with the specific and
primary aim of imposing a collateral consequence that is triggered by
that offense.78 In other cases, prosecutors will charge particular
offenses (or decline to charge particular offenses) in order to avoid
triggering specific collateral consequences they believe would be an
unjust or unnecessary sanction.79 But the bottom line in both
contexts is the same: prosecutors often consider collateral
consequences when deciding what charges, if any, to file in a
particular case.
Collateral consequences likewise influence plea bargaining
between prosecutors and defense counsel.80 Professional standards of

important and applicable collateral consequences. The advice must then be both
comprehensive and specific; it must focus on the important consequences without
failing to warn about all of them—it must simultaneously be thick and thin.”).
77. Smyth, “Collateral” No More, supra note 75, at 156 (emphasis added).
78. See generally Crane, supra note 10, at 778–79 (explaining that attaching
collateral consequences to misdemeanor offenses provide prosecutors with
incentives to charge “borderline” crimes as misdemeanors rather than felonies);
see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 699 (“[T]he imposition of collateral
consequences has become an increasingly central purpose of the modern criminal
process.”); Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of
Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126, 1187 (2013) (discussing
how “immigration consequences are [often] an express prosecutorial goal of the
conviction” in Maricopa County, Arizona).
79. Academic literature is full of such anecdotes and hypotheticals. See, e.g.,
Catherine A. Christian, Awareness of Collateral Consequences: The Role of the
Prosecutor, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 621, 622 (2006) (arguing that
prosecutors must consider the impact of collateral consequences such as “Civil
Asset Forfeiture Programs,” and only pursue them when it would ensure justice
is achieved); Smyth, Not a Bad Word, supra note 75, at 494–96 (showing that
when individuals charged with minor crimes would be subject to
disproportionately harsh collateral consequences, prosecutors have allowed pleas
for lesser offenses); see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 8:3, 8:7. These types
of charging decisions are especially pronounced in discussions involving
deportation. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 31, at 579 (noting instances when
prosecutors have been willing to charge crimes as misdemeanors instead of
felonies when the collateral consequences of the felony could result in the
defendant being deported).
80. See LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 8:6 (“Integrating collateral
consequences into plea bargaining is consistent with constitutional, ethical, and
professional standards.”); see also Altman, supra note 35, at 23 (“There are
various ways in which the prosecution and defense may shape a plea agreement
to achieve one or more of these immigration-related goals.”).
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conduct for both prosecutors81 and defense attorneys82 recommend
that collateral consequences be considered when negotiating and
shaping plea bargains. And the reasoning underneath such ethical
standards is obvious: “Without considering collateral consequences,
lawyers cannot effectively advise their clients about the risks and
benefits of pleading guilty, and cannot effectively negotiate the terms
of guilty pleas.”83
Because “collateral consequences in many
instances are what is really at stake” in a criminal case, it should
come as no surprise that potential collateral consequences are often
a—if not the—focal point of negotiations over a criminal case’s
disposition.84
In the context of sentencing, collateral consequences may also be
considered by judges and can influence the ultimate sentence they
impose on the defendant. Indeed, considering collateral consequences
“at sentencing is consistent with the idea—expressed not only in
sentencing theory but also in many jurisdictions’ statutory
directives—that sentences must be proportionate to the offense and
consistent with general fairness principles.”85 Accordingly, various
standards and codes of conduct, such as the American Bar
Association’s (“ABA”) Criminal Justice Standards, direct courts to
consider “applicable collateral sanctions in determining an offender’s
overall sentence.”86 And many courts have explicitly reached the
same conclusion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, for example, has held that district judges must consider
collateral consequences during sentencing, observing that it “is
difficult to see how a court can properly calibrate a ‘just punishment’
[one of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)87] if it does
not consider the collateral effects of a particular sentence.”88
81. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 8:7 (“Consideration of collateral
consequences is recommended in professional standards for prosecutors.”).
82. Id. § 8:6 (“A variety of professional standards recommend that defense
counsel bargain about collateral consequences that are significant to a client’s
interests, since plea discussions may be a criminal defendant’s first and only
opportunity to avoid collateral consequences.”).
83. Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 736.
84. UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, Prefatory Note at
4 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010).
85. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 8:19.
86. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSON § 19-2.4(a) (AM. BAR
ASS’N, 3d ed. 2004).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
88. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 141 (2d Cir. 2009). But see United
States v. Morgan, 635 F. App’x. 423, 446 (10th Cir. 2015) (identifying circuit split
on whether federal district courts should consider collateral consequences when
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
For one prominent example of a district judge imposing a sentence deeply
influenced by the collateral consequences a defendant faced, see United States v.
Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Chevelle Nesbeth was
convicted by a jury of importation of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent
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In sum, collateral consequences are inextricably intertwined with
most aspects of the criminal justice system. They can, and often do,
substantially impact defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and
judges. And because collateral consequences are such an important
part of many criminal cases, they can, and often do, significantly
affect charging decisions, plea negotiations, and a case’s ultimate
disposition.
2. The Current Irrelevance of Collateral Consequences to
Criminal Procedure
While collateral consequences may be integral to many aspects of
the criminal justice process, one place they have not been integrated
is the distribution of criminal procedural entitlements. In fact, given
how enmeshed collateral consequences are in the criminal justice
system, they play a surprisingly small role in the allocation of
procedural entitlements to criminal defendants.
To begin, it is important to recognize that not all criminal
defendants receive the same fleet of procedural protections when
facing criminal prosecution.89 Indeed, the vast majority of criminal
defendants receive something less than a jurisdiction’s most
protective bundle of procedural rights.90 For example, only some
defendants receive the right to counsel,91 only some defendants have
a right to a preliminary hearing or grand jury,92 only some defendants

to distribute. Her advisory guidelines sentencing range was 33-41 months.
Nonetheless, I rendered a non-incarceratory sentence today in part because of a
number of statutory and regulatory collateral consequences she will face as a
convicted felon. I have incorporated those consequences in the balancing of the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in imposing a one-year probationary sentence.”).
89. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.8(c) (4th ed.
2015) (“Every jurisdiction provides for some procedural differences based upon a
distinction between major and minor crimes.”); see also Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2012). Some procedural
entitlements do apply uniformly. For example, in all cases the government must
establish each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). And several trial rights, such as those
guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause, apply to all criminal prosecutions,
including misdemeanors. See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth
Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 538 (2009).
90. See Natapoff, supra note 89, at 1350 (“If the United States Supreme
Court can be said to have a misdemeanor theory, it is that lesser punishments
should trigger reduced procedural entitlements.”). Misdemeanors account for
over eighty percent of all criminal cases, with recent estimates placing the total
number of misdemeanor cases at about ten million per year. Id. at 1320. In other
words, if the criminal justice system were a car wash, relatively few defendants
would be afforded the “gold package” of procedural entitlements.
91. Id. at 1340.
92. See Gabriel J. Chin & John Ormonde, Infamous Misdemeanors and the
Grand Jury Clause, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1911, 1911–12 (2018).
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are entitled to the most fulsome degree of discovery,93 and only some
defendants may demand a jury trial.94
Given this reality, how procedural protections are allocated—and
to whom they are in fact distributed—is critically important. The
main dividing line when it comes to allocating procedural
entitlements is whether the defendant is charged with a felony or a
misdemeanor offense.95 Defendants charged with a felony, which is
an offense that authorizes more than one-year imprisonment upon
conviction,96 receive a jurisdiction’s most protective bundle of
entitlements. Defendants charged with a misdemeanor, which is an
offense that authorizes one year or less imprisonment upon
conviction,97 receive a less protective bundle of procedural
protections. In other words, the determination of whether a
defendant receives the “gold package” of procedural protections turns
on a single metric: the potential term of imprisonment that defendant
faces.
As I have detailed elsewhere, “an offense’s collateral
consequences, no matter how severe, are generally deemed irrelevant
for determining what procedural safeguards apply. In other words, a
misdemeanor that threatens a severe collateral consequence is
classified the same as any other misdemeanor in a jurisdiction’s
criminal justice system.”98
Accordingly, depending on the
jurisdiction,
many
misdemeanor
defendants—including
misdemeanor defendants facing severe collateral consequences like
deportation or sex offender registration—will not be entitled to our
legal system’s most hallowed procedural protections, like the right to
counsel and the right to demand a jury trial.99
The current relationship between collateral consequences and
criminal procedures therefore presents something of a puzzle.
Although collateral consequences are increasingly recognized as

93. Crane, supra note 10, at 780.
94. Id.
95. See discussion infra Subpart IV.A. A defendant’s right to counsel and
right to demand a jury trial are a little more complicated than the
felony-misdemeanor divide that governs nearly every other procedural
entitlement that is not uniformly distributed across defendants. But the main
point for now is this: all felony defendants receive the right to counsel and right
to a jury trial, while only some misdemeanor defendants receive the right to
counsel and the right to a jury trial.
96. Crane, supra note 10, at 786.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 796; see Clapman, supra note 15, at 602–03 (explaining that a
defendant’s right to counsel is not affected by the possibility of a severe collateral
consequence upon conviction); see also Crane, supra note 10, at 800–11 (detailing
how the right to a grand jury, the right to a preliminary hearing, the right to
discovery, and the right to a jury trial are not affected by the possibility of a
severe collateral consequence upon conviction).
99. See discussion infra Subparts IV.A., V.A.
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“central” to the criminal justice process,100 they are effectively ignored
when it comes to the allocation of criminal procedural entitlements
across defendants. The next Subpart analyzes some of the reasons
why this curious state of affairs continues to persist.
C. Cracks, But Not Breaks, in the Wall Separating Collateral
Consequences and Criminal Procedure
This Subpart analyzes why collateral consequences, despite
playing a central role in the criminal justice system, are not accounted
for when allocating procedural entitlements. In particular, it
identifies a key and oft-overlooked reason for this curious state of
affairs: the prospect of incorporating collateral consequences into
criminal procedure presents conceptually tricky and doctrinally
difficult line-drawing issues, thereby discouraging courts and
legislatures from departing from the prison-centric status quo.
Before diving further into that reason, however, a few other
possibilities need to be addressed. One possible explanation—that
collateral consequences are not that important—can be quickly
dismissed. As discussed above, collateral consequences are now a
critical part of the criminal justice process. Another possibility—that
criminal justice actors, including courts and legislatures, are not yet
aware of the significance of collateral consequences in the criminal
justice system—is similarly unavailing. While that lack of awareness
may have been true decades ago (if it was ever true at all), the
increasingly important role of collateral consequences has been well
documented by courts and commentators alike.101
Another possibility—that there is a “doctrinal wall” separating
collateral consequences from criminal procedure rules—requires a
little more attention. Indeed, I suspect that this explanation, that
collateral consequences simply fall “outside” the procedural rules
governing criminal cases, is the reason most criminal justice
observers would suggest first for why collateral consequences are
rarely considered when it comes to distributing procedural
entitlements. 102
To be sure, there are several criminal justice doctrines that have
excluded collateral consequences from their scope. For example,
courts have repeatedly held that collateral consequences are
effectively outside the reach of the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto

100. See Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2, at 684 (2006) (“An
integrated perspective . . . recognizes the centrality of collateral consequences to
the criminal process. . . .”).
101. See United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2016);
see also Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197,
1197 (2016).
102. See Crane, supra note 10, at 778 n.2.
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prohibitions103 and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause,104 on the grounds that collateral consequences
are not “punishment” as required by those proscriptions.105
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the distinction
between direct and collateral consequences first gained legal
prominence in the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. United
States,106 which considered a trial court’s obligations when accepting
a defendant’s guilty plea.107 In Brady, the Supreme Court established
that, in order to comply with the Due Process Clause’s voluntariness
requirement, a trial court needs to ensure only that a defendant is
aware of the “direct consequences” of conviction before entering a
guilty plea.108 Consequently, under the rule established in Brady, a
trial court has no obligation to inform a defendant of a conviction’s
potential collateral consequences before it accepts the plea as valid.109
And it is from Brady that a related and important doctrine began to
flourish: when advising a client whether to accept a guilty plea,
counsel need not inform that client about a conviction’s potential
collateral consequences.110 (More on this doctrine in a moment.)
There is thus surely something to the claim that collateral
consequences have not been integrated into the allocation of
procedural entitlements because they are not the sort of sanctions
other constitutional rules consider when determining the scope of
their own protections. Indeed, I agree with that claim, at least as far
as it goes. I think that is one of the reasons why collateral
consequences are generally not considered when distributing
procedural entitlements.

103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.”); Id. § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto
Law. . . .”).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
105. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003) (holding that sex
offender registration scheme is “nonpunitive, and its retroactive application does
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause”); see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 3:7
(collecting cases involving Ex Post Facto challenges); id. § 3:14 (collecting cases
involving Cruel and Unusual Punishment challenges).
106. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
107. Id.; see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 706, 726–30 (discussing
Brady v. United States).
108. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571,
572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957)).
109. Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 726–30 (discussing trial court’s duty
under Brady to ensure that a guilty plea is voluntary).
110. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 & n.9 (2010) (collecting cases
for the proposition that “collateral consequences are outside the scope of
representation required by the Sixth Amendment” (citation omitted)). See
generally Chin & Holmes, supra note 2 (discussing the collateral consequences
rule); Roberts, supra note 7 (discussing the need to require a full disclosure of
serious collateral consequences of guilty pleas).
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What I seek to establish here, however, is that this explanation
is not as persuasive, or comprehensive, as it might seem at first blush.
To put it another way, the wall separating collateral consequences
from procedural entitlements is not as high and not as impermeable
as this explanation would suggest. While there may not (yet) be
breaks in that metaphorical wall, there are certainly many significant
cracks. In other words, there is in fact no strict separation between
collateral consequences and procedural entitlements—and there
never really has been.111
For example, in a long line of cases that began in the 1940s, the
Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant’s appeal of his
conviction is not rendered moot by the completion of his sentence (that
is, his “punishment”), so long as he remains subject to potential
collateral consequences from the challenged conviction.112 And as the
Supreme Court explained in Sibron v. New York113 in 1968, a
defendant appealing his conviction need not establish “the actual
existence of specific collateral consequences”—rather, it will “in effect
[be] presumed” that collateral consequences of conviction exist.114
This presumption, the Court pointed out, reflects “the obvious fact of
life that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral
legal consequences.”115 Accordingly, “a criminal case is moot only if it
is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal
consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged
conviction,” a showing that rarely will be possible.116 Since Sibron,
courts have “proceeded to accept the most generalized and
hypothetical of consequences as sufficient to avoid mootness in
challenges to [one’s] conviction” on appeal, even though his or her
sentence has been completed.117 In other words, the Court has long
recognized that a defendant’s procedural right to appeal his or her
conviction is preserved against claims of mootness by the mere
possibility of that conviction’s inevitable collateral consequences.
Perhaps the most visible crack in the metaphorical wall dividing
collateral consequences and procedural entitlements is the Supreme
Court’s landmark opinion in Padilla in 2010. Until Padilla, and as
noted above, it was widely accepted that counsel need not advise a
client about any potential collateral consequences of conviction before
pleading guilty. That understanding was significantly disrupted by
Padilla. In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the then-consensus
111. Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 699 (“The idea that collateral
consequences are divorced from the criminal process has never really been
true . . . .”).
112. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53–58 (1968) (summarizing earlier
decisions).
113. Id. at 40.
114. Id. at 55.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 57.
117. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 10 (1998).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375149

W 03_CRANE.DOCX

26

(DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/19 1:23 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

view that “the failure of defense counsel to advise the defendant of
possible deportation consequences is not cognizable as a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel.”118 Emphasizing “the seriousness of
deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea,” the Court held that,
under the Sixth Amendment, “counsel must inform her client whether
his plea carries a risk of deportation.”119
Critically, the Supreme Court’s holding in Padilla was limited to
immigration consequences.120 Recognizing that the Supreme Court
itself had “never applied a distinction between direct and collateral
consequences to define the scope of constitutionally ‘reasonable
professional assistance’ required under Strickland,”121 the Court
concluded that “[w]hether that distinction is appropriate is a question
we need not consider in this case because of the unique nature of
deportation.”122 The Court therefore left to the lower courts the
question of whether counsel has a constitutional obligation to advise
his or her client about other (nonimmigration) collateral
consequences of conviction. Perhaps unsurprisingly, “since Padilla
was decided there have been lower court rulings going both ways on
the issue of whether its logic and reasoning extend counsel’s advisory
obligations beyond deportation to other consequences of conviction
that are not part of the court-imposed sentence.”123 In other words,
the Court’s decision in Padilla added significant new cracks to the
metaphorical wall, even if the wall was still left standing.
Finally, and most pertinently for purposes of this Article, the
Supreme Court has nodded towards the potential relevance of
collateral consequences in the context of a defendant’s right to
demand a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. As will be explained
in more detail in Part V, a defendant charged with a “petty” offense
has no federal constitutional right to a jury trial.124 The lodestar for
determining whether an offense is petty is the potential term of
imprisonment it authorizes.125 An offense that threatens more than
six months imprisonment is always considered nonpetty and
automatically triggers a defendant’s right to trial by jury.126
Conversely, an offense that carries a maximum term of imprisonment
of six months or less is “presumed” to be petty.127 The presumption is

118. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 374.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 365.
122. Id.
123. LOVE ET AL., supra note 20, § 4:7 (collecting cases).
124. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989);
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970).
125. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541–42.
126. Id. at 542.
127. See id. at 543. The Supreme Court has also clarified that the critical
inquiry is whether any single offense authorizes a term of imprisonment in excess
of six months. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 323–24 (1996).
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rebutted, and the defendant has a right to a jury trial, “if he can
demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in
conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration,
are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that
the offense in question is a ‘serious’ one.”128
The Supreme Court’s reference to “additional statutory
penalties” in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas129 suggests that at
least some collateral consequences may be pertinent when
determining whether a defendant has a federal constitutional right to
a jury trial.130 Nevertheless, courts have routinely deemed several
significant collateral consequences irrelevant to the Sixth
Amendment calculus.131 Indeed, the leading criminal procedure
treatise summarizes post-Blanton case law as follows: “Generally, in
assessing whether an offense is petty or not, lower courts have agreed
that only authorized statutory penalties are to be taken into account;
collateral consequences do not count.
Significant additional
penalties, it seems, will not trigger a jury right.”132 In other words,
although the Supreme Court has indicated that an offense’s potential
collateral consequences can theoretically trigger a defendant’s right
to a jury trial, that possibility has remained largely theoretical.
So why have courts declined to extend more broadly holdings like
Blanton (jury trial) or Padilla (effective assistance of counsel) or
Sibron (mootness), all of which recognize the relevance of collateral
consequences to procedural entitlements?
One important and
underappreciated reason is that such extension would require courts
to engage in difficult line-drawing decisions given the
incommensurability issues raised by collateral consequences. Put
another way, incorporating collateral consequences into procedural
entitlements more broadly is complicated and potentially messy, and
that reality alone is a significant impediment to lower courts
expanding the cracks created by cases like Blanton and Padilla
absent more forceful direction from the Supreme Court.
Whatever one might think about procedural regimes based solely
on the punishment of imprisonment,133 the use of a single metric
lends itself to clear and easy-to-draw lines. If, for example, a
particular procedural entitlement turns exclusively on whether a
defendant faces more or less than one year of imprisonment upon
conviction, it is conceptually and administratively easy to know
whether that defendant is in fact entitled to the procedural right at

128. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543.
129. Id. at 541.
130. See Crane, supra note 10, at 808–09.
131. See id. at 809–10.
132. 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 89, § 22.1(b).
133. For my own views critiquing such regimes, see Crane, supra note 10,
passim.
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issue. Collateral consequences, on the other hand, come in all shapes
and sizes—and there are literally hundreds of them.134
There is no single metric to compare the relative severity of
different collateral consequences to one another or to the sanction of
imprisonment. Consider questions like the following: Is registration
as a sex offender more or less severe than losing one’s professional
license? Is being precluded from possessing a firearm more or less
severe than being disqualified from public housing or public food
assistance? Is deportation the functional equivalent of six months
imprisonment? Two years? Five years? Is lifetime registration as a
sex offender, with all its attendant burdens, the functional equivalent
of three months imprisonment? Three years? You get the point.
There is no smooth and obvious “exchange rate” across all these
various currencies.
In addition to the incommensurability issues raised by
incorporating collateral consequences, collateral consequences also
vary across a number of different dimensions that do not exist when
it comes to imprisonment. For example, some collateral consequences
are imposed by sovereigns other than the prosecuting jurisdiction.
Should those be factored in? Some collateral consequences apply only
to some defendants, depending on their status or other personal
characteristics. Should those be considered? These complexities
merely add to judicial concerns about incommensurability and
slippery slopes.135
In short, there are cracks in the doctrinal walls separating
collateral consequences and criminal procedures, but courts
(especially lower courts) are understandably and predictably hesitant
to widen those cracks given the incommensurability issues and
line-drawing problems associated with incorporating collateral
consequences. The metric of imprisonment is simple and clean;

134. See, e.g., Chin & Holmes, supra note 2, at 699–700 (listing examples of
collateral consequences such as deportation, voter disenfranchisement, and loss
of federal benefits).
135. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 390 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (claiming that the right recognized by the majority in Padilla “has no
logical stopping point”); People v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168, 185–87 (N.Y. 2018)
(Garcia, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the majority’s decision to extend the
constitutional right to a jury trial to a defendant facing deportation “will prove
unworkable” and “create a lack of predictability” going forward) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Judge Fisher of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals explicitly expressed these concerns during an oral argument in a recent
case about whether a defendant has the right to a jury trial because a conviction
would subject him to deportation. See Oral Argument at 29:03–33:25, Bado v.
United
States,
186
A.3d
1243
(D.C.
2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90tVZVSElzg (explicitly raising “slippery
slope” concerns about recognizing a right to a jury trial for a defendant subject to
deportation upon conviction and stating that such a holding would lead to “quite
a crazy patchwork and a lot of work for people trying to decide whether jury trials
should be granted”).
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collateral consequences are varied and messy. The metric of
imprisonment lends itself to bright lines and clear rules; collateral
consequences lend themselves to more complicated lines and a
preference for standards. As a result, we now find ourselves in the
otherwise curious place of simultaneously recognizing that the
imposition of collateral consequences on defendants is a fundamental
goal and tremendously important part of the criminal justice process
but declining to recognize the relevance of collateral consequences
when allocating procedural entitlements to defendants.
The remainder of this Article seeks to ease these line-drawing
concerns and proposes a path forward for incorporating collateral
consequences into procedural entitlements, a path that has thus far
eluded courts and commentators.136 Part III sets forth a general
framework for incorporating collateral consequences—a framework
that requires relatively minimal alterations to current doctrines and
is eminently feasible. Parts IV and V then take the framework of Part
II and apply it to two separate constitutional rights—the right to
counsel and the right to demand a jury trial—demonstrating how the
framework I articulate in Part III can (and should) work in practice.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR INCORPORATING COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES INTO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Subpart A lays out my proposed framework for incorporating
collateral consequences into the allocation of procedural entitlements.
Subpart B untangles collateral consequences and organizes them in
a way that primes them to be incorporated into various procedural
rights. Subpart C then analyzes how to consider the relative severity
of various collateral consequences in a way that is consistent with
existing doctrines.
A.

The Path Forward

Before detailing my proposed approach for incorporating
collateral consequences, a preliminary remark is in order. The
specific framework I suggest is heavily influenced by concerns of
practicality and feasibility. In particular, my proposal seeks to work
within existing doctrine as much as possible. Legal change, and in
particular judicially-managed legal change, tends to be incremental
and hemmed in by precedent. My framework recognizes that reality
when explaining how best to incorporate collateral consequences into
current determinations about procedural allocations.
136. As noted earlier, commentators have previously tended either to focus
simply on immigration, see supra note 15, or argue that a procedural entitlement,
like the right to counsel, should be allocated universally to all defendants given
the increased prevalence of collateral consequences, see supra note 16. This
Article looks beyond immigration to other collateral consequences and identifies
a more feasible path forward (doctrinally and budgetarily) than the calls for
universal expansion of procedural entitlements.
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In other words, for purposes of this Article, I do not argue that
where the lines have been drawn for particular rights they should be
altered.137 For example, I do not claim that the line dividing those
defendants who receive a right to a jury trial from those defendants
who presumptively do not—six months potential imprisonment—
should be changed in some way. I do not, for example, argue that the
dividing line should be moved to three months potential
imprisonment, or that all defendants should receive a right to a jury
trial. Rather, I leave the lines of demarcation for each procedural
entitlement where I find them and instead explain a path forward
where collateral consequences are factored in given those existing
dividing lines.138
With that out of the way, below is my proposed path forward. As
an initial matter, each procedural entitlement needs to be viewed
separately and treated individually. Each procedural right has its
own set of dividing lines and its own set of rationales for why those
lines are drawn where they are. Accordingly, the incorporation of
collateral consequences must be on a right-by-right basis. That said,
the methodology for incorporating collateral consequences is the same
across all procedural entitlements. My approach consists of three
steps:
1. Step One: Identifying the Theory for How the Procedural
Right at Issue Is Allocated Across Defendants
First, courts should identify the dividing line for the particular
right at issue and then ascertain the theory that underlies that
dividing line. In other words, courts must theorize why some
defendants receive the right and others do not. What is the line of
demarcation representing and seeking to achieve? How does the right
at issue address relative severity and, therefore, how is it allocated
across defendants? The answer to these questions can and will vary
137. For one interesting example of scholars advocating for a new dividing
line when it comes to the constitutional right to counsel, see Brandon Buskey &
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon’s Promise: Using Equal Protection to
Address the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299,
2304 (2017) (urging courts to “abando[n]” the current “actual incarceration”
standard for triggering the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and
replacing it with a new line grounded in the right to meaningful access to courts
under the Equal Protection Clause).
138. I also, for purposes of this Article, take it as a given that collateral
consequences should be incorporated into determinations about how procedural
entitlements are allocated. As I have argued elsewhere, doing so would honor
the basic principle that serious penalties warrant serious procedures. See Crane,
supra note 10, at 782. Incorporating collateral consequences would yield
numerous benefits to the criminal justice system and its participants. See id. at
834–38. Moreover, and as discussed in Part I, collateral consequences are
already enmeshed with many other aspects of the criminal justice system—
incorporating them when it comes to allocating procedural entitlements would be
more, not less, consistent with that reality.
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depending on the entitlement at issue. Some rights, for example, will
consider relative severity from the perspective of the defendant—is
the defendant facing a consequence (e.g., imprisonment) of sufficient
severity to trigger heightened procedural protections?139 Other rights
will consider relative severity from a different perspective, such as
that of the legislature, asking whether the offense with which the
defendant is charged is sufficiently serious from a societal standpoint
to trigger heightened procedural protections.140
In addition, courts theorizing the dividing line for a given right
must pay special attention to whether the dividing line is based on
potential sanctions or guaranteed sanctions. Potential sanctions are
those that may, but ultimately may not, come to fruition. Most, but
not all, procedural rights are triggered by potential sanctions.141
Guaranteed sanctions are, as one might imagine, sanctions that will
in fact be imposed on the defendant upon conviction. Fewer
procedural rights, but still some, are triggered by sanctions that will
definitely be imposed if the defendant is convicted.142
When it comes to this potential-guaranteed axis, my framework
adheres to the following analogy (the importance of which will become
more apparent shortly): Collateral consequences that may, but may
not, be imposed upon conviction—that is, collateral consequences
where some modicum of discretion exists before imposition—are akin
to potential imprisonment.
Collateral consequences that are
mandatorily imposed upon conviction are akin to actual
imprisonment.
2. Step Two: Determining Which Collateral Consequences are
Eligible to be Considered
After ascertaining the theoretical underpinnings for how a
particular procedural entitlement is allocated across defendants, the
next step is to decide which collateral consequences should be
considered when deciding whether a collateral consequence triggers
that entitlement. Not every collateral consequence will or should be
eligible for such consideration. That would be unwieldy and, more
importantly, would ignore the theory underlying the allocation of the
right at issue.
Take the following example: If a procedural entitlement is only
triggered by actual imprisonment (and therefore is not triggered by
potential imprisonment), collateral consequences that are merely
possible but not guaranteed should be excluded when deciding
whether a defendant is entitled to that procedural protection. To
consider collateral consequences that may not ever come to fruition
would be inconsistent with how the line treats imprisonment, since
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 831, 833–34.
See id. at 830–31.
See discussion infra Subparts II.B.2., IV.A.
See discussion infra Subparts II.B.2., IV.A.
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potential imprisonment alone does not trigger the procedural
protection. If, however, the entitlement can be triggered by potential
imprisonment (regardless of whether any actual imprisonment is
imposed), then collateral consequences that may not ultimately be
imposed should also be considered.
Subpart III.B. goes into such eligibility considerations in more
detail and identifies three characteristics of collateral consequences
that will be relevant for determining which collateral consequences
should be considered for incorporation under any particular right.
For now, it is important to understand that the second step in my
general framework is determining which collateral consequences are
eligible for consideration. A collateral consequence’s eligibility will
depend on the theory underlying the allocation of the right at issue—
and not every collateral consequence will be eligible for each
entitlement. It is a consequence-by-consequence and right-by-right
inquiry.
3. Step Three: Deciding Whether an Eligible Collateral
Consequence is Sufficiently Severe to Entitle the Defendant to the
Procedural Protection at Issue (a.k.a., Conducting the “Relative
Severity” Analysis)
After concluding which collateral consequences are eligible for
consideration for a particular entitlement, the third and final step is
to determine whether any eligible collateral consequence is
sufficiently severe to trigger the entitlement at issue. If, for example,
a procedural entitlement is triggered by six months of potential
imprisonment, the court should determine whether an eligible
collateral consequence should be considered at least as severe as six
months potential imprisonment. Or, if a procedural entitlement is
triggered by one year of potential imprisonment, the court should
determine whether an eligible collateral consequence is at least as
severe as one year of potential imprisonment.
Subpart III.C. explains how courts should go about determining
the relative severity of collateral consequences, including how they
should focus on the same sort of liberty interests that existing
doctrines emphasize when it comes to imprisonment. The point for
now is that the final step is to take each eligible collateral
consequence and determine whether it is sufficiently severe, based on
where the demarcation line exists for the right at issue, to trigger the
procedural entitlement.
In sum, when incorporating collateral consequences into
procedural entitlements, courts should: (1) ascertain the theory of
relative severity that underlies the allocation of the right at issue; (2)
determine which collateral consequences are eligible for
consideration, based on the theory of relative severity it developed in
step one; and (3) determine whether any eligible collateral
consequence is sufficiently severe to trigger the entitlement at issue.
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B. Which Collateral Consequences Are Eligible?:
The Multiple Dimensions of Collateral Consequences
As eluded to earlier, collateral consequences come in all shapes
and sizes. This can make the project of incorporating collateral
consequences into criminal procedural entitlements a complicated
enterprise. Indeed, it is precisely these sorts of complications that
discourage courts and legislatures from seeking to incorporate
collateral consequences more broadly. This Subpart eases some of
that complexity by cataloging collateral consequences along several
key dimensions: (1) whether the consequence is imposed
automatically; (2) whether the consequence is imposed by the same
sovereign prosecuting the offense; and (3) whether the consequence
applies uniformly to all defendants convicted of the relevant offense.
Examining these dimensions is important because they are
relevant to a threshold issue that must be addressed when
incorporating collateral consequences: which consequences should be
considered when determining whether a defendant is entitled to a
particular procedural entitlement.143 This is step two of my general
framework. The classifications detailed below are instructive for
determining whether a particular consequence should be eligible for
consideration depending on the procedural right at issue.
1. Is the Collateral Consequence Imposed Automatically upon
Conviction?
The first dimension to consider is whether the collateral
consequence is imposed automatically upon conviction, or rather if it
is ultimately imposed at the discretion of an administrative entity
(and therefore may not ever actually be imposed). Some, but not all,
collateral consequences are imposed automatically upon
conviction.144 I will call consequences imposed automatically upon
conviction “guaranteed sanctions” and consequences that may not
ultimately be imposed “potential sanctions.”145
143. An alternative approach, and one I do not adopt here, is to simply say
that all collateral consequences should be eligible for consideration. That would
be inconsistent with the theory and rationale for any right that is not allocated
to all defendants. If not, all defendants facing some term of imprisonment, for
example, receive the procedural protection, why should all collateral
consequences be considered? The consequences considered should track the
theory underlying how the right is distributed—and for any right that is allocated
to some (but not all) defendants, some (but not all) collateral consequences should
be eligible for consideration.
144. See, e.g., Robert M. A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, 16 CRIM. JUST.
32, 33 (2001) (“These collateral consequences are simply a new form of mandated
sentences.”); see also Crane, supra note 10, at 795 (explaining how many
collateral consequences like sex offender registry and firearm prohibitions are
mandatory and “cannot be circumvented by a sentencing judge”).
145. This distinction is similar to distinctions drawn by the ABA Criminal
Justice Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualifications
and the Uniform Collateral Consequences Act.
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The distinction is important when it comes to incorporating
collateral consequences into procedural entitlements because some
rights are allocated based on “guaranteed sanctions”—like
guaranteed imprisonment146—and some rights are allocated based on
“potential sanctions”—like potential imprisonment.147 For rights
allocated based on guaranteed sanctions, only those collateral
consequences that are automatically imposed upon conviction should
be considered at step three of my framework.
For the four consequences described in Part II, two are
guaranteed sanctions and two are potential sanctions: sex offender
registration requirements and firearm prohibitions are guaranteed
sanctions; immigration consequences and disqualification from public
benefits are potential sanctions.148

The ABA Criminal Justice Standards classifies collateral consequences as
“collateral sanctions” or “discretionary disqualifications.” It defines “collateral
sanctions” as “a legal penalty, disability or disadvantage, however denominated,
that is imposed on a person automatically upon that person’s conviction for a
felony, misdemeanor or other offense, even if it is not included in the sentence.”
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSON § 19-1.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N, 3d ed. 2004).
And it defines “discretionary disqualification” as “a penalty, disability or
disadvantage, however denominated, that a civil court, administrative agency, or
official is authorized but not required to impose on a person convicted of an
offense on grounds related to the conviction.” Id. § 19-1.1(b).
The Uniform Collateral Consequences Act defines a collateral consequence as a
“collateral sanction or disqualification.” UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONVICTION ACT § 2.1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS
2010). It then defines “collateral sanction” as
a penalty, disability, or disadvantage, however denominated, imposed
on an individual as a result of the individual’s conviction of an offense
which applies by operation of law whether or not the penalty, disability,
or disadvantage is included in the judgment or sentence. The term does
not include imprisonment, probation, parole, supervised release,
forfeiture, restitution, fine, assessment, or costs of prosecution.
Id. § 2.2. And defines “disqualification” as “a penalty, disability, or disadvantage,
however denominated, that an administrative agency, governmental official, or
court in a civil proceeding is authorized, but not required, to impose on an
individual on grounds relating to the individual’s conviction of an offense.” Id. §
2.5.
146. Thiersaint v. Comm’r of Corr., 111 A.3d 829, 833 (Conn. 2015).
147. Id.
148. When it comes to consequences ultimately imposed at the discretion of a
civil or administrative entity, there may be some debate over how to
conceptualize the pertinent consequence. Take immigration consequences as an
example. If the consequence is conceptualized as being deported from the United
States, then that consequence is ultimately discretionary and may not actually
materialize. If, however, the consequence is conceptualized as “becoming
deportable”—that is, a change in legal status—then that consequence is
automatic and happens immediately upon conviction. For purposes of this
Article, I conceptualize the pertinent consequence as things beyond a change in
legal status. This is because all convictions lead to a change in legal status—one
of convicted criminal.
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2. Is the Collateral Consequence Imposed by the Same
Sovereign Prosecuting the Offense?
The next question to consider is whether the collateral
consequence is imposed by the prosecuting jurisdiction or a separate
sovereign. Many collateral consequences are imposed by the same
sovereign prosecuting the offense. But some collateral consequences
are imposed by a sovereign that is separate from the one prosecuting
the case. For example, a criminal conviction in state court can trigger
consequences imposed by the federal government, such as
immigration consequences,149 certain firearm prohibitions,150 and
some disqualifications from public benefits.151 Similarly, a criminal
conviction in federal court can trigger consequences imposed by a
state government, such as sex offender registration requirements152
or disqualification from other public benefits.153
Whether a collateral consequence is imposed by the same or
separate sovereign is relevant in the following way: if the procedural
entitlement at issue is allocated based on how serious the prosecuting
jurisdiction perceives the offense to be, then collateral consequences
imposed by other jurisdictions should not be considered in the relative
severity analysis. This is because consequences imposed by other
sovereigns fail to reflect the views of the prosecuting jurisdiction. If,
however, the procedural entitlement is allocated based on relative
severity from the perspective of the defendant, then consequences
imposed by other sovereigns are relevant to the analysis. This is
because, from where the defendant stands, it does not matter which
government imposes the collateral consequence but rather whether
the consequence will or may be imposed at all.
Immigration consequences are imposed only by the federal
government and thus will only be the same sovereign for federal
prosecutions. Sex offender registration is imposed by both state and
federal governments and thus can be the same sovereign for both
state and federal prosecutions. The federal firearm prohibition will
be the same sovereign for federal prosecutions and a different
sovereign for state prosecutions. Similarly, for states that have
adopted firearm prohibitions for misdemeanor convictions, they will
be the same sovereign for state prosecutions and different sovereign
for federal prosecutions. Finally, disqualifications for public benefits
are imposed by state and federal governments, and thus whether a
particular consequence is imposed by the same or separate sovereign

149. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d)(1) (2012).
151. See Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral Consequences in the
Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal Code,
2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 253–54.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 16912(a)–(b) (2012).
153. See Love, supra note 151, at 253–54.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375149

W 03_CRANE.DOCX

36

(DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/19 1:23 PM

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

will depend on whom is prosecuting the case and which consequence
is being considered.
3.

Does the Consequence Uniformly Apply to All Defendants?

The final question to consider is whether the collateral
consequence is uniformly imposed on all defendants convicted of the
given offense or if the consequence is imposed only on some
defendants. Most consequences apply the same to all defendants
convicted of a qualifying offense. For example, firearm prohibitions,
sex offender registration requirements, and most disqualifications
from public benefits are uniformly applied to all defendants.154 But
some consequences do not work this way. For example, immigration
consequences do not apply evenly across defendants; rather, they
apply only to noncitizen defendants. For example, an American
citizen and non-American citizen can both be convicted of the same
misdemeanor drug offense, but only the noncitizen will face the
collateral consequence of deportation.155
Whether a collateral consequence is imposed uniformly across all
defendants convicted of a particular offense is relevant for much the
same reason that the identity of the jurisdiction imposing the
consequence is relevant—it relates to which perspective the
procedural right at issue adopts when considering relative severity.
If the theory underlying the entitlement views relative severity from
the perspective of the defendant, then it does not matter whether the
collateral consequence applies to some defendants but not others. All
that matters is whether the consequence may be imposed on that
particular defendant.
If, however, the theory underlying the
entitlement views relative severity from the perspective of the
legislature that adopted the offense charged, consequences that are
not imposed uniformly should be excluded from consideration and
therefore ineligible for the relative severity analysis performed in
step three of my framework.
Immigration consequences are not imposed uniformly, as only
noncitizen defendants can be subject to such consequences.
Requirements imposed on sex offenders are applied uniformly across
defendants.156 Firearm prohibitions are likewise imposed uniformly
across defendants charged with the same offense.157
Finally,
154. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
155. The fact that immigration consequences may be the basis for heightened
procedural protections raises one of the most interesting and fascinating
questions about integrating collateral consequences into criminal procedure. For
instances where immigration consequences entitle a defendant to additional
procedures, one upshot is that noncitizen defendants will receive more procedural
entitlements than American citizens charges with the identical offense.
156. See, e.g., Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 540–42 (Ariz. 2008) (concluding
that sex offender registration requirements were uniformly applied to all
similarly situated defendants).
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (d)(1) (2012).
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disqualifications from public benefits may or may not be applied
uniformly, depending on the precise collateral consequence at
issue.158
Below are two charts that summarize the above discussion.
Because the vast majority of criminal convictions in the United States
are by state jurisdictions, the first chart is by far the more important
one.
CHART 1: STATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS:
For State
Criminal
Convictions:
Immigration
Consequences
Sex Offender
Requirements
Firearm
Prohibitions
Disqualification
from Public
Benefits

Apply
Automatically?

Same
Sovereign?

Apply
Uniformly?

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Maybe

Yes

Maybe

Maybe

Maybe

CHART 2: FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS:
For Federal
Criminal
Convictions:
Immigration
Consequences
Sex Offender
Requirements
Firearm
Prohibitions
Disqualification
from Public
Benefits

C.

Apply
Automatically?

Same
Sovereign?

Apply
Uniformly?

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Maybe

Yes

Maybe

Maybe

Maybe

Ranking the Relative Severity of Collateral Consequences

After determining which collateral consequences should be
considered (step two), the next step is deciding whether an eligible
collateral consequence is sufficiently severe to trigger the procedural
entitlement at issue (step three). This is another area where

158. See Love, supra note 151, at 253–54.
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incorporating collateral consequences can be rife with complexity
and, in particular, raises numerous issues related to
incommensurability.159
Recall that under existing law the
determination of whether a defendant receives a particular
entitlement turns on a single type of sanction—imprisonment.160 By
incorporating collateral consequences, however, things can no longer
be so simple. This Subpart addresses two important questions about
how to determine whether an eligible collateral consequence is
sufficiently severe to trigger the entitlement at issue. In so doing, I
also seek to substantially lessen concerns about incommensurability
and slippery slopes.
The first question is whether relative severity should be viewed
from an objective or subjective perspective. Viewing relative severity
from a subjective perspective means judging (and comparing) the
severity of a particular consequence on an individualized basis.161
Each person will experience a particular consequence differently. For
some, losing the right to possess a firearm might be a tremendously
significant consequence—weightier than jail time. For others, losing
that right might yield little more than a shoulder shrug. For some
defendants, especially the impoverished, being prohibited from public
housing or certain welfare programs could be devastating. For other
defendants, like white collar criminals, such disqualifications might
be utterly inconsequential. A subjective assessment of severity would
depend on each individual and how each collateral consequence would
be experienced by that individual. As a result, a subjective
assessment would vary from person to person and consequence to
consequence.
This approach offers some benefits. For example, assessing the
relative severity of a particular consequence on an individual basis
would further the goal of individualized treatment in the criminal
justice system.162 Furthermore, such an approach might appear to
ease some of the incommensurability concerns associated with
collateral consequences because all one needs to do is inquire about
how a particular consequence would impact a particular defendant.
The need to determine whether sex offender registration or
disqualification from public housing is, as a general matter, more
severe would be unnecessary; all that would be necessary would be to
determine which is more severe for that specific defendant. Likewise,
the difficult task of determining how many months imprisonment a
particular collateral consequence would “equal” would be avoidable;

159. For a thoughtful and interesting essay on related issues involving
relative crime severity, see generally Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and
Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957 (2004).
160. See supra Part I.
161. See Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 71, 123–24 (2007).
162. Id. at 123.
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all that needs to be determined is how many months imprisonment is
the functional equivalent of a particular collateral consequence for a
specific defendant.
The costs of the subjective approach, however, far outweigh the
benefits. To begin, such an individualized, case-by-case approach
would prove exceedingly difficult. It would be hard, to say the least,
to accurately and fairly assess how severe each and every collateral
consequence would be for each and every defendant. Indeterminacy
of that magnitude, combined with the wide discretion afforded trial
judges on such matters, would likely lead to disparate results across
defendants. And, like other disparate results, it would likely have a
regressive impact on racial and ethnic minorities and on indigent
defendants. Such an approach would also incentivize defendants to
claim that whatever collateral consequences applied were, in fact,
quite severe to them—even if that were not true. A defendant facing
firearm prohibitions might actually care very little about her Second
Amendment rights, but if claiming that such a prohibition would
severely impact her were the difference between the right to counsel
or the right to a jury trial, then odds are that defendant will have a
newfound appreciation for her right to bear arms.
Finally, a subjective approach would be inconsistent with current
doctrines about relative severity, all of which follow an objective
approach—that is, an approach that objectively assesses the relative
severity of a particular sanction.163 For example, when determining
whether a defendant is entitled to a right that turns on potential
imprisonment—say the right to a jury trial, which is automatically
given for offenses authorizing more than six months imprisonment—
courts do not inquire about the impact such imprisonment might have
on an individual defendant, or how that individual defendant would
be affected by such a possible stint in the clink.164 As with any
possible sanction, not all defendants are going to experience
imprisonment equally.
For example, some defendants might
experience five months imprisonment the same way another would
experience six months. Does that mean the first defendant should
also receive a jury trial? Existing doctrines offer a resounding no.
They instead all look at relative severity through an objective lens.
The same should be done when it comes to incorporating collateral
consequences.
Having determined that the relative severity of a collateral
consequence should be viewed objectively, the next question to
163. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (“In determining
whether the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other
punishment is enough in itself to require a jury trial, we . . . refer to objective
criteria.”).
164. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541–44 (1979) (determining that prison
conditions for pretrial defendants do not amount to a Due Process violation,
“particularly where it appears that nearly all pre-trial detainees are released
within 60 days”).
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consider is what metric or method should be used to assess a
consequence’s relative severity. Once again, there are several options
from which to choose, assuming the right at issue does not provide
further guidance. For example, severity could be assessed based on
the degree to which it infringes on a constitutional right (e.g., firearm
prohibitions scoring high, public benefit disqualifications scoring
low). Or it could be assessed based on the degree to which it directly
impacts a defendant’s day-to-day life (e.g., public benefit
disqualifications scoring high, firearm prohibitions scoring low).
And, once again, I propose hewing closely to existing doctrines
and, specifically, the deprivation of constitutional liberty interests of
the sort akin to imprisonment. More specifically, I believe courts,
absent more specific guidance based on the right at issue, should
assess a collateral consequence’s relative severity by considering
whether the consequence deprives or otherwise infringes on a
defendant’s constitutional liberty interests to approximately the same
degree as the relevant term of imprisonment.165
This, to be sure, is an opaque standard, and one that is subject to
reasonable disagreement. While it might be nice to imagine a neat
and tidy way to translate all collateral consequences into months of
imprisonment—for example, deportation is worth sixty months’
imprisonment, lifetime sex offender registration is worth thirty
months, and so on—such an enterprise would be little more than
pulling numbers out of thin air.
Fortunately, such precise measurements are rarely if ever
needed for purposes of allocating procedural entitlements. Most
entitlements are triggered by either any amount of imprisonment
(one day or more), more than six months imprisonment, or more than
one year imprisonment.166 Thus, courts need only roughly assess a
collateral consequence’s relative severity, placing it in one of four
categories: (1) the functional equivalent of no imprisonment; (2) the
functional equivalent of less than six months imprisonment (but more
than zero); (3) the functional equivalent of six months and one day
imprisonment to one year imprisonment; and (4) the functional
equivalent of more than one year imprisonment.
Recognizing there is room for reasonable disagreement, my own
suggestion would be to assess the four collateral consequences
165. Derendal v. Griffith, 104 P.3d 147, 154 (Ariz. 2005) (“To mandate a jury
trial, collateral consequences must approximate in severity the loss of liberty that
a prison term entails.”); see also United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993)
(considering whether a five-thousand-dollar fine and five years of probation with
certain conditions “approximate the severe loss of liberty caused by imprisonment
for more than six months”); Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542
(1989) (acknowledging that penalties other than imprisonment, such as
“probation or a fine may engender ‘a significant infringement of personal
freedom,’ but they cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison
term entails”).
166. See infra Parts III (counsel), IV (jury).
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discussed in this Article as follows. Immigration consequences, such
as permanent banishment from the United States, is the functional
equivalent of more than one-year imprisonment. “Like incarceration,
deportation separates a person from established ties to family, work,
study, and community. In this forced physical separation, it is similar
in severity to the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.”167 Because
removal from the United States is for at least ten years and often for
life,168 deportation is the functional equivalent of more than one-year
imprisonment.169
Sex offender registration is either the functional equivalent of
more than one year imprisonment or the functional equivalent of six
months and one day imprisonment to one year imprisonment.170
Lifetime sex offender registration seems to fit comfortably in the
latter and, while some may disagree, I believe fifteen years of sex
offender registration is also a sanction that should be considered the
functional equivalent of more than one year imprisonment.
With respect to firearm prohibitions, I believe these are the
functional equivalent of one day to six months’ imprisonment—
especially lifetime firearm bans. “[T]he right to keep and bear arms,”
the Supreme Court has held, “is fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty.”171
Firearm prohibitions thereby infringe on
constitutional liberty interests more than zero,172 but not nearly as
much as sex offender registration requirements or deportation do. I
accordingly would consider such prohibitions as the functional
equivalent of between one day and six months’ imprisonment.
As for disqualification from public benefits, this presents to me
the most difficult category to assess.
On the one hand,
disqualifications from public benefits can, depending on the
167. Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1250 (D.C. 2018) (citations and
alterations omitted).
168. Id. at 1251, n.14 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1229a).
169. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017) (recognizing that
“preserving the right to remain in the United States may be more important to
the client than any potential jail sentence”).
170. See, e.g., Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d. 536, 541–44 (Ariz. 2008) (explaining
why lifetime sex offender registration is a severe penalty—“much more severe
than a comparatively short probation period”); see also Wayne A. Logan, Liberty
Interested in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender
Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1168–70
(1999); Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders: Liberty, Protectionism,
Justice, and Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397, 1398–99 (2009); Rachel
Marshall, I’m a Public Defender. My Clients Would Rather Go to Jail than
Register as Sex Offenders, VOX (July 5, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016
/7/5/12059448/sex-offender-registry.
171. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767, 778 (2010) (“[I]t is clear
that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right
to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system
of ordered liberty.”).
172. See, e.g., id. at 778; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29
(2008).
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defendant, have a truly significant impact on a defendant’s way of
life.173 On the other hand, disqualifying a defendant from public
benefits does not infringe on any recognized constitutional liberty
interest—they are more like privileges than constitutional rights.
And such disqualifications typically do not look or act like banishment
in the way deportation does or, to a lesser extent, sex offender
registration requirements do. Depending on the specific benefit at
issue, I would therefore categorize disqualification from public
benefits either as the functional equivalent of no imprisonment or the
functional equivalent of six months or less imprisonment—with most
such collateral consequences being the equivalent of no
imprisonment.
The following chart summarizes my suggested categorizations of
collateral consequences:
CHART 3: THE FUNCTIONAL IMPRISONMENT EQUIVALENTS FOR FOUR
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
Functional
Equivalent
Time
Imprisonment:
Immigration
Consequences
Sex Offender
Registration
Firearm
Prohibitions
Disqualification
from Public
Benefits

~No
~One Day to ~More than ~More than
Imprisonment Six Months Six Months One year
to One Year
X
X
X
X

Again, I want to emphasize that assessing the functional
equivalent of any given collateral consequence is an area where
reasonable people can disagree. Moreover, for purposes of my project,
the real point is to encourage courts (and legislatures) to begin
thinking about collateral consequences in terms of these four
categories: (1) ~No imprisonment; (2) ~one day to six months
imprisonment; (3) ~six months and one day imprisonment to one year
imprisonment; and (4) ~More than one year imprisonment. While
courts may at the outset reach different conclusions, they ultimately
will settle on some sort of consensus over time. In other words, any
likely disagreement about appropriate categorization should not be a
deterrent to engaging in the enterprise itself.
173. See generally Pinard, An Integrated Perspective, supra note 2 (explaining
the myriad of issues facing persons convicted of criminal offenses reentering
society).
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IV. INCORPORATING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES INTO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
This Part incorporates collateral consequences into the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Subpart A examines the circumstances
in which the Supreme Court has held that an indigent defendant is
entitled to counsel.
Subpart B explains which collateral
consequences, based on the lines identified in Subpart A, should be
eligible for consideration under my framework. And Subpart C
explains the circumstances in which a defendant should be entitled to
counsel based on the collateral consequences he or she faces.
A.

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.”174 Through a series of twentieth-century decisions, the
Supreme Court extended the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel to
include the right of an indigent defendant to have counsel appointed
and paid for by the government.175 In Gideon v. Wainwright,176 the
Supreme Court applied that right to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.177 In so doing, the Court observed that “any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”178 The Court
has further recognized that the vital aid provided by counsel is by no
means limited to potential assistance at the trial itself: “[T]o deprive
a person of counsel during the period prior to trial,” the Court has
cautioned, “may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the
trial itself.”179 This is because “the right to counsel safeguards the
other rights deemed essential for the fair prosecution of a criminal
proceeding.”180
In addition, defense counsel also provides crucial—perhaps even
outcome-altering—assistance through pretrial investigation of the

174. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
175. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) (“There is considerable
doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of
the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused
in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his
defense.”).
176. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
177. Id. at 341–42.
178. Id. at 344 (describing this as “an obvious truth” and proclaiming that
“[t]he right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours”); see also
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) (“The assistance of counsel is often
a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial.”).
179. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985).
180. Id.; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) (“Without counsel
the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through
counsel that the accused secures his other rights.” (citations omitted)).
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government’s case,181 considered preparation of possible defenses,182
and informed plea bargaining.183 As the Supreme Court has
observed, the “adversarial testing process” that lies at the heart of the
American criminal justice system “will not function properly unless
defense counsel has done some investigation into the prosecution’s
case and into various defense strategies.”184 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has indicated that a conviction secured without “the guiding
hand of [defense] counsel” is not “sufficiently reliable to permit
incarceration” since it was not “subjected to the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing.”185
Finally, “because the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than
the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a
defendant,” counsel’s assistance (or the lack thereof) during plea
negotiations can dramatically alter a defendant’s fate.186 A defense
attorney can “help to reduce the power imbalance between the state
and the defendant by playing the roles of counselor (ensuring that
defendants understand the consequences of accepting a plea offer)
and negotiator (trying to negotiate the best plea possible).”187
Without the assistance of counsel, a defendant that pleads guilty is
likely to do so on comparatively worse plea terms than if counsel were
provided.188 And, perhaps most critically, an innocent defendant
proceeding alone may be more likely to plead guilty than if he had
counsel’s aid.189
Given all this, it is no surprise that the Supreme Court has
declared that “[t]he right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is indispensable to the fair

181. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680–81 (1984).
182. Id.
183. See Crane, supra note 10, at 825.
184. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384. See generally Jenny Roberts, Too Little,
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1106 (2004)
(“Adversarial testing requires thorough exploration of defenses as to both guilt
and potential penalties and also investigation into the prosecution’s case.”).
185. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 665, 667 (2002) (citation omitted).
186. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“[D]efendants require
effective counsel during plea negotiations.”).
187. Clapman, supra note 15, at 596.
188. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (observing that
“[c]ounsel is needed” for purposes of plea bargaining and guilty pleas “so that the
accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the
prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the
prosecution”).
189. Clapman, supra note 15, at 596–97 (“Defendants, even if innocent, plead
guilty to a misdemeanor with less trepidation. Many may plead guilty on the
rational calculation that the apparently minimal penalty attached to a plea
conviction is preferable to the alternative: pretrial detention; the time that a trial
will consume; the resultant lost wages, lost job security, and lost family time; and
the risk of a greater penalty after trial.”).
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administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.”190 And
given all this, it is surprising (at least to the uninitiated) that many
indigent defendants do not have a constitutional right to counsel.191
Although the importance of counsel has been universally recognized
by courts and commentators,192 the right to counsel is not allocated
universally to all defendants. Rather, the Supreme Court has held
that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel only under one
of two circumstances.
First, any defendant charged with a felony offense has a federal
constitutional right to counsel.193 “[A]bsent waiver,” the Supreme
Court has explained, the “right to appointed counsel in felony cases is
absolute.”194
Second, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor offense has a
constitutional right to government-provided counsel if he is
“sentenced to a term of imprisonment.”195 In other words, “no
indigent criminal defendant [may] be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to
assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.”196 This is sometimes
referred to as the “actual imprisonment” standard.197
The Supreme Court has therefore drawn two lines when it comes
to allocating the constitutional right to counsel—one for defendants
charged with a felony offense and one for defendants charged with a
misdemeanor offense. If charged with a felony offense, the defendant
has an “absolute” right to counsel based simply on the potential
sanctions associated with felony offenses.
If charged with a
misdemeanor offense, however, the defendant has a right to counsel
only if there is the actual (or guaranteed) sanction of imprisonment.
The Court has justified its comparatively unusual line-drawing
for misdemeanor defendants on three interrelated grounds. First,
having “departed from the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment”
by extending its protections to include the appointment of counsel for
indigent defendants, the Court has recognized that it must fashion on
190. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168–69 (1985).
191. Crane, supra note 10, at 826–27.
192. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979).
193. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (confirming
that a defendant charged with a felony offense has the constitutional right to
counsel regardless of whether any prison time is actually imposed on the
defendant); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
194. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 664 (2002).
195. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74.
196. Id. at 374; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[N]o person
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). In Alabama v. Shelton,
the Supreme Court clarified that a suspended prison sentence also may not be
imposed on a misdemeanor defendant unless he was represented by counsel. 535
U.S. at 662.
197. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373 (adopting “actual imprisonment as the line
defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel”).
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its own some set of parameters for when the right to counsel applies,
even though the “precise limits and their ramifications” is less than
“clear.”198 In other words, once the Court decided to extend the right
to counsel beyond its original understanding, it also had to determine
how far “to extrapolate an already extended line.”199
Second, when deciding how far to extend the right to counsel, the
Court has consistently rejected expanding it to all criminal
defendants because such an “extension would create confusion and
impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite
diverse States.”200
Third, and finally, concerns about causing such confusion or
budgetary woes in the states must yield when it comes to sanctions
the Court deems “so severe” that they “should not be imposed as a
result of a criminal trial unless an indigent defendant had been
offered appointed counsel to assist in his defense”—”regardless of the
cost to the States implicit in such a rule.”201 Under existing
precedent, the Court has concluded only that incarceration, “even for
a brief period,” is sufficiently severe to require the appointment of
counsel.202
This is because, according to the Court, “actual
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere
threat of imprisonment”—and therefore actual imprisonment, but not
fines or the possibility of imprisonment, warrant the appointment of
counsel.203
Although the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Padilla v.
Kentucky expanded the constitutional obligations of defense counsel
198. Id. at 372.
199. Id. The Court has also recognized that it “cannot fall back on the common
law as it existed prior to the enactment of that Amendment, since it perversely
gave less in the way of right to counsel to accused felons than to those accused of
misdemeanors.” Id.
200. Id. at 373. For a representative sampling of the extensive academic
literature calling for the right to counsel to be extended to all criminal
defendants, see Clapman, supra note 15; King, supra note 16; Marcus, supra note
16; Roberts, supra note 46.
201. Scott, 440 U.S. at 372–73; see also Shelton, 535 U.S. at 667 (describing
the “key Sixth Amendment inquiry” as “whether the adjudication of guilt
corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit
incarceration”).
202. Scott, 440 U.S. at 372–73.
203. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994) (“We reasoned that
the Court, in a number of decisions, had already expanded the language of the
Sixth Amendment well beyond its obvious meaning, and that the line should be
drawn between criminal proceedings that resulted in imprisonment, and those
that did not.”); Scott, 440 U.S. at 367.
To be clear, nearly half of the states go beyond the federal constitutional-floor
and provide counsel to an indigent defendant if he is charged with a misdemeanor
that merely authorizes incarceration. See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 89, §
11.2(a). A significant number of states, however, still limit the right to counsel
to those instances in which imprisonment is actually imposed. See id.; see also
Shelton, 535 U.S. at 669 n.8; Clapman, supra note 15, at 593 n.43 (providing a
sample of state requirements).
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when it comes to advising a client about potential immigration
consequences,204 those advice-related rights apply only in cases where
the defendant has an entitlement to counsel in the first place.205
Immigration consequences, like other collateral consequences, are
still deemed irrelevant when determining whether a defendant has a
constitutional right to counsel.206 Under existing precedent, “states
allow trial courts to avoid appointing counsel simply by certifying that
they will not impose incarceration regardless of the seriousness of the
misdemeanor offense or the possibility that it will carry other
consequences,” such as deportation, sex offender registration, or other
significant sanctions.207
Notably, when considering whether a defendant has a
constitutional right to counsel, the Supreme Court considers the
severity of the sanction from the perspective of the defendant.208 This
is true both for the felony-based potential sanction line209 and the
misdemeanor-based guaranteed sanction line.210
Indeed, the
Supreme Court has described the “key Sixth Amendment inquiry” as
“whether the adjudication of guilt . . . is sufficiently reliable to permit”
the imposition of a particular penalty (e.g., incarceration) on the
defendant.211 The focus is on the impact the penalty has on the
defendant, and whether an adjudication without counsel is
permissible given that penalty.
B.

Which Collateral Consequences Should Be Considered

Because the Supreme Court has considered relative severity from
the perspective of the defendant, the fact that a collateral
consequence may be imposed by a separate sovereign is not a basis
for exclusion in this context. Similarly, a collateral consequence is
204. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010).
205. See id.
206. Clapman, supra note 15, at 603.
207. See id. at 592–93; Crane, supra note 10, at 827 n.254 (“As a matter of
federal constitutional law, courts have uniformly concluded that an offense’s
potential collateral consequences have no bearing on whether an indigent
defendant is entitled to counsel.”).
As a matter of state law, a handful of jurisdictions have indicated that
an offense’s collateral consequences may be relevant to defining the
scope of the right. But those jurisdictions are few in number and,
generally speaking, appear to consider an offense’s collateral
consequences as merely one factor among many when deciding whether
the right to state-provided counsel applies in a given case.
Id. (citing 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 89, § 11.2(a)).
208. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (citations omitted)
(recognizing a right to counsel for any actual imprisonment because “the prospect
of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused
as a trivial or ‘petty’ matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions
affecting his career and his reputation”).
209. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
210. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
211. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 667 (2002).
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eligible for consideration even if it is not imposed across all
defendants convicted of a particular offense. This is because the right
to counsel inquiry is a defendant-specific one: what are the
consequences faced by the defendant in this case? It does not matter
if the consequences are faced by only some defendants charged with
that offense, and it does not matter if the consequence is imposed by
a separate sovereign.
Since the Supreme Court has drawn two separate lines for
allocating the constitutional right to counsel—one for felony
defendants and one for misdemeanor defendants—considering which
collateral consequences are eligible for incorporation also requires
two tracks. And, depending on which track a defendant is claiming a
right to counsel, some collateral consequences should be excluded
from consideration.
For defendants seeking the right to counsel based on the
misdemeanor track, only those collateral consequences that are
guaranteed sanctions should be considered.
In other words,
consequences that may not ultimately be imposed should be excluded,
because the misdemeanor track focuses on actual sanctions, not
potential ones. Accordingly, defendants invoking this track may not
claim a right to counsel based on potential immigration consequences
or potential disqualifications from public benefits, as those involve
potential sanctions, not guaranteed sanctions.
For defendants seeking the right to counsel based on the felony
track, however, all consequences may be considered. This is because
the felony track is not limited to “actual imprisonment,” but rather
triggers the right to counsel based merely on potential sanctions.
In sum, all collateral consequences may be considered, except for
potential sanctions invoked under the misdemeanor track. There,
only guaranteed sanctions—that is, those consequences applied
automatically upon conviction—should be eligible.
C.

Incorporating Collateral Consequences

As noted, existing Supreme Court doctrine allocates the right to
counsel along two tracks. For a defendant invoking the felony
track,212 he should be afforded the right to counsel if he faces a
potential collateral consequence that is the functional equivalent of
more than one year imprisonment. This mirrors the rule set forth in
Gideon and subsequent cases that afford a defendant the right to
counsel when charged with a felony, which is an offense that
212. To be clear, I call this the “felony track” even though only misdemeanor
defendants would be the ones claiming a right to counsel on the basis of a
collateral consequence—since a defendant charged with a felony would already
have the constitutional right to counsel. My use of “felony track” and
“misdemeanor track” refers to the two distinct bases for the right to counsel under
existing Supreme Court case law—a track based on potential sanctions (felony
track) and a track based on guaranteed sanctions (misdemeanor track).
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threatens more than one year imprisonment. Under this track,
therefore, defendants facing potential immigration consequences
upon conviction and defendants facing sex offender registration upon
conviction should be entitled to counsel. As explained above, each of
these consequences are, in my view, the functional equivalent of more
than one year imprisonment.
For a defendant invoking the misdemeanor track, he should be
afforded the right to counsel if he faces a guaranteed sanction that is
the functional equivalent of at least one day imprisonment. This
mirrors the rule established in Argersinger213 and Scott,214 where a
defendant is entitled to counsel if he or she is sentenced to any term
of actual imprisonment.215 Under this track, therefore, defendants
facing firearm prohibitions that are imposed automatically upon
conviction should be afforded counsel.216 This is consistent with a
provision of the federal law prohibiting possession of a firearm for
those convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Under
18 U.S.C §921(a)(33), the federal firearm prohibition should not apply
after a conviction for what would otherwise qualify as a
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” unless “the person was
represented by counsel in the case, or knowingly and intelligently
waived the right to counsel in the case.”217
Finally, any disqualifications from public benefits that are
imposed automatically upon conviction and rise to the level of the
functional equivalent of at least one day in jail should also trigger the
right to counsel—although I expect that few such consequences will
ultimately surpass that threshold.
V. INCORPORATING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES INTO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
This Part incorporates collateral consequences into the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial. Subpart A explains current
Supreme Court doctrine regarding the right to demand a jury trial,
and theorizes the line dividing those defendants entitled to a jury trial
and those that are not. Subpart B then analyzes which collateral
consequences are eligible for consideration based on the line
identified in Subpart A. And Subpart C explains which collateral
consequences should trigger the right to a jury trial.
A.

The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial

The Framers believed a defendant’s right to demand a jury trial
was so important that they included it in the U.S. Constitution
213. 407 U.S. 25.
214. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
215. Id. at 374; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
216. Defendants facing sex offender registration requirements imposed
automatically upon conviction should also be entitled to counsel under this track.
217. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A)(i), (B)(i)(I) (2012).
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twice.218 The constitutional right to a jury trial, since incorporated
against the states,219 provides a criminal defendant with “an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”220 According
to the Supreme Court, the right to a jury trial exists “in order to
prevent oppression by the Government” and reflects a deep
“reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.”221 By “insist[ing] upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence,”
the constitutional right to request a jury trial protects “against
arbitrary law enforcement” and is “essential for preventing
miscarriages of justice.”222
Jury trials, and the possibility of a jury trial, also impose
significant costs on the government. “Compared to bench trials, jury
trials often require prosecutors to engage in more intensive
preparation and frequently entail more pretrial litigation over
procedural and evidentiary issues.”223 Jury trials also, on average,
take substantially longer than bench trials.224 Taken together, this
means defendants with the right to demand a jury trial can threaten
to consume the government’s most depleted and precious resource:
time.225 As one scholar put it, “by withholding the jury trial right
governments gain a major strategic advantage, depriving defendants
of the option to threaten exercise of the right, with its associated
218. Article III, Section 2 states: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 3. And the Sixth
Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
219. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was incorporated against the
states in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
220. Id. at 156. Blackstone described trial by jury as “the grand bulwark” of
English liberties. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 246 (1999) (quoting
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 342–44); see also District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 634 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (observing that
there is a “grave danger to liberty when one accused must submit to the uncertain
judgment of a single magistrate”).
221. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155–56.
222. Id. at 156, 158; see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970)
(“[T]he primary purpose of the jury is to prevent the possibility of oppression by
the Government; the jury interposes between the accused and his accuser the
judgment of laymen who are less tutored perhaps than a judge or panel of judges,
but who at the same time are less likely to function or appear as but another arm
of the Government that has proceeded against him.”); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (“[T]he essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the
interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment
of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared
responsibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or
innocence.”).
223. Crane, supra note 10, at 807.
224. See id. at 806.
225. See id. at 806–08.
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adverse impact on dockets and justice system resources.”226 For all
these reasons, affording a defendant “the right to a jury trial very
likely serves its intended purpose of making judicial or prosecutorial
unfairness less likely.”227
Despite the Supreme Court’s grand pronouncements about the
importance and value of the right to a jury trial, not all criminal
defendants are afforded such a right. “At the time of the adoption of
the Constitution there were numerous offenses, commonly described
as ‘petty,’ which were tried summarily without a jury.”228 This “petty
offense” exception, in which defendants charged with a petty offense
do not receive the right to a jury trial, has been justified on the
grounds that “the possible consequences to defendants from
convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to
outweigh the benefits to efficient law enforcement and simplified
judicial administration resulting from the availability of speedy and
inexpensive adjudications.”229 Put another way, for some defendants,
the potential consequences of conviction are insufficiently severe to
warrant imposing the attendant burdens of jury trials on the
government and courts.230
Because the Constitution does not explicitly provide for how to
balance those competing interests, “the definitional task” of
establishing the “boundaries of the petty offense category” has
“fall[en] on the courts,” and it is the courts that must “draw a line in
the spectrum of crime, separating petty from serious infractions.”231
The Supreme Court has drawn that line as follows: An offense that
threatens more than six months imprisonment is always considered
serious and automatically triggers a defendant’s constitutional right

226. Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local
Criminal Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 143, 158 (2009).
227. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158.
228. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937); see also
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (“So-called petty offenses were tried without juries both
in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt from the
otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial
provisions.”).
229. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
230. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) (“Where the accused
cannot possibly face more than six months’ imprisonment, we have held that
these disadvantages, onerous though they may be, may be outweighed by the
benefits that result from speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications.”).
231. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160–61. As the Court recognized in Duncan, that
“process, although essential, cannot be wholly satisfactory, for it requires
attaching different consequences to events which, when they lie near the line,
actually differ very little.” Id. at 161. “Indeed, the prospect of imprisonment for
however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or ‘petty’
matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and
his reputation.” Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73.
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to trial by jury.232 An offense that carries a maximum term of
imprisonment of six months or less is presumed to be petty.233 That
presumption is rebutted, however, and the defendant is entitled to a
jury trial “if he can demonstrate that any additional statutory
penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period
of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative
determination that the offense in question is a ‘serious’ one.”234 Other
penalties that the Supreme Court has explicitly considered include
fines,235 probation,236 and—most importantly for purposes of
considering collateral consequences—suspension of a driver’s
license.237
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, therefore, whether a
defendant is entitled to demand a jury trial depends on the relative
severity of the offense with which he or she is charged. And the
relative severity of that offense is determined by the penalties the
legislature has attached to a conviction for that offense—primarily,
but not exclusively, the potential term of imprisonment.238
232. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541–42 (1989);
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68–69. As a result, all felony defendants, but only some
misdemeanor defendants, have a constitutional right to a jury trial. A
misdemeanor defendant charged only with a “petty” offense has no federal
constitutional right to a jury trial.
233. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. The Court previously “focused on the
nature of the offense and on whether it was triable by a jury at common law.” Id.
at 541 (citing District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930)); Callan v.
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555–57 (1888)). See generally Colleen P. Murphy, The
Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 133, 133–
35 (tracing the Court’s various approaches to the petty offense exception over
time). According to the Court, it shifted its attention to an offense’s potential
term of imprisonment because that is a “more ‘objective indication[] of the
seriousness with which society regards the offense.”’ Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541
(quoting Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969)).
234. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543. In Blanton, the Court predicted that it would
be the “rare situation where a legislature packs an offense it deems ‘serious’ with
onerous penalties that nonetheless do not puncture the 6-month incarceration
line.” Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5
(1993) (repeating the “rare case” observation made in Blanton). Notably, the
Court made these predictions when misdemeanor offenses triggered far fewer
collateral consequences than they do today.
235. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837–
38 (1994); Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 4; Blanton, 489 U.S. at 544; Muniz v. Hoffman,
422 U.S. 454, 476 (1975).
236. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 5.
237. Blanton, 489 U.S. at 544 n.9 (“[W]e cannot say that a 90-day license
suspension is that significant as a Sixth Amendment matter, particularly when
a restricted license may be obtained after only 45 days.”).
238. Id. at 542 (“In using the word ‘penalty,’ we do not refer solely to the
maximum prison term authorized for a particular offense. A legislature’s view of
the seriousness of an offense also is reflected in the other penalties that it
attaches to the offense.”).
Whereas a number of states follow the federal constitutional baseline when
determining the scope of a defendant’s right to a jury trial, many others exceed
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Critically, the allocation of the constitutional right to a jury trial
is based on potential severity as viewed from the perspective of the
legislature—not from the perspective of the defendant. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has specifically recognized that “the prospect of
imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the
accused as a trivial or ‘petty’ matter and may well result in quite
serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation.”239 But
the defendant’s perspective, the Court has reiterated, is not the
relevant inquiry. Instead, when “deciding whether an offense is
‘petty,’ [the Court has] sought objective criteria reflecting the
seriousness with which society regards the offense.”240
The Court’s focus on the legislature and its view on severity was
on full display in Lewis v. United States.241 In Lewis, the Supreme
Court considered whether a defendant charged with multiple petty
offenses was entitled to a jury trial, given that he faced in the
aggregate more than six months imprisonment.242 The defendant in
Lewis was charged with two separate offenses, each of which carried
a maximum of six months imprisonment, and therefore faced up to
one year imprisonment in total.243 The Court held that “no jury trial
right exists where a defendant is prosecuted for multiple petty
offenses,” even if “the aggregate prison term authorized for the
offenses exceeds six months.”244
The Court clarified that the critical inquiry is whether any single
offense authorizes a term of imprisonment in excess of six months.245
This is because the right to a jury trial is reserved for “defendants
accused of serious crimes,” and “we determine whether an offense is
serious by looking to the judgment of the legislature.”246 “The fact
that the [defendant] was charged with two counts of a petty offense
does not revise the legislative judgment as to the gravity of that
particular offense, nor does it transform the petty offense into a

the constitutional floor and provide more expansive jury trial rights. See Murphy,
supra note 233, at 171–73. For example, several states require a trial by jury for
all offenses that authorize any amount of potential imprisonment. See id. at 171–
72. And some jurisdictions provide all criminal defendants a right to a jury trial.
See id. at 171.
239. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
240. Id. at 68 (emphasis added); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
160 (1968) (“The penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken as a
gauge of its social and ethical judgments of the crime in question.”(citation
omitted)); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (noting that
the right to a jury trial is based on severity as understood and reflected by the
“laws and practices of the community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical
judgments”).
241. 518 U.S. 322 (1996).
242. Id. at 323.
243. Id. at 326.
244. Id. at 323.
245. Id. at 326–27.
246. Id. at 327.
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serious one, to which the jury trial right would apply.”247 The Court
acknowledged that “the aggregate potential penalty faced by [the
defendant] is of serious importance to him.”248 “But to determine
whether an offense is serious for Sixth Amendment purposes,” the
Court emphasized, “we look [only] to the legislature’s judgment.”249
In other words, “[w]here we have a judgment by the legislature that
an offense is ‘petty,’ we do not look to the potential prison term faced
by a particular defendant, who is charged with more than one such
petty offense.”250
Notably, the Supreme Court has also limited its “legislative
judgment” inquiry to the legislature that enacted the offense at
issue.251 When determining whether a defendant has a constitutional
right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court has held that the petty offense
inquiry is based on whether the legislature that adopted the offense
viewed it as serious. For example, in Blanton v. City of North Las
Vegas,252 the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant charged
with DUI under Nevada law had a constitutional right to a jury
trial.253 Nevada law provided that the defendant, if convicted of the
DUI offense, could serve up to six months in jail, face up to
one-thousand-dollar fine, would have to attend an alcohol abuse
education course, and would lose his driver’s license for ninety
days.254
The Court concluded that the defendant had no
constitutional right to a jury trial, because “we do not believe that the
Nevada Legislature has clearly indicated that DUI is a ‘serious’
offense.”255 The Court later explained the inquiry required by

247. Id. The Court went on to note that
[t]he Constitution’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial extends only
to serious offenses, and [the defendant] was not charged with a serious
offense. That he was tried for two counts of a petty offense, and
therefore faced an aggregate potential term of imprisonment of more
than six months, does not change the fact that the Legislature deemed
this offense petty. [The defendant] is not entitled to a jury trial.
Id. at 330.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 328. Based on the Court’s ruling in Lewis, a prosecutor that
carefully engages in misdemeanor charge stacking can bring multiple charges
and still avoid triggering a defendant’s right to a jury trial. For more on this
practice.
251. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–44, 545 n.11 (1989).
This is significant because, as discussed above, other sovereigns (such as the
federal government) may impose additional penalties upon conviction.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 543–44.
254. Id. at 539–40.
255. Id. at 544 (emphasis added). The Court specifically declined “petitioners’
invitation to survey statutory penalties for drunken driving in other States. The
question is not whether other States consider drunken driving a ‘serious’ offense,
but whether Nevada does.” Id. at 545 n.11.
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Blanton in the following terms: “the question [is] whether a particular
legislature deemed a particular offense ‘serious.’”256
B.

Which Collateral Consequences Should Be Considered

As explained above, the right to a jury trial is allocated based on
the relative severity of the offense charged, and an offense’s relative
severity is viewed from the perspective of the legislature that adopted
the offense. When determining relative severity, courts look to
potential penalties that might result from a conviction. This means
that “potential sanctions,” such as potential collateral consequences
that may not ultimately materialize, may be considered. I accordingly
disagree with courts, such as the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in Foote v. United States,257 that have refused to consider
collateral consequences that “could be imposed only in hypothetical
civil or administrative proceedings.”258 Potential sanctions, not just
guaranteed sanctions, are also relevant when it comes to the
constitutional right to a jury trial.
While potential sanctions should be considered, collateral
consequences that are imposed by a separate sovereign should be
excluded when determining whether a defendant has the
constitutional right to a jury trial. This is because such consequences
do not reflect the views of the legislature that adopted the offense.
Likewise, collateral consequences that are not imposed uniformly
across defendants should be excluded from consideration, as a
sanction imposed only on some defendants does not indicate that the
legislature which adopted the offense believed that specific offense
was sufficiently severe.
As a result, immigration consequences, some firearm
prohibitions, and some disqualifications from public benefits should
not be considered when deciding whether the right to a jury trial is
triggered. Sex offender requirements, some firearm prohibitions, and
some public benefit disqualifications, on the other hand, should be
eligible for consideration in step three of my incorporation framework.
I will now walk through each set of consequences, explaining whether
and why they are eligible for consideration.
1.

Immigration Consequences

Regardless of whether the prosecution is by a state government
or the federal government, immigration consequences should not be
considered when determining whether the defendant has a
256. United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 4 (1993). In Nachtigal, the
Supreme Court concluded that a DUI charge under federal law was a petty
offense because Congress viewed it as such, based on the penalties it authorized
upon conviction.
See id. at 4 (referring to the “controlling legislative
determination” made by Congress).
257. 670 A.2d 366 (D.C. 1996).
258. Id. at 372.
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constitutional right to a jury trial. With respect to state prosecutions,
any possible immigration consequences of conviction will be imposed
by a separate sovereign—the federal government.259
Thus,
immigration consequences that flow from a state conviction are not
the sort of penalty that reflects how the legislature that adopted the
offense (that is, the state government) views the relative severity of
that offense.
There have been three recent cases about whether a defendant
subject to potential deportation upon conviction has a constitutional
right to a jury trial, but only one reached the right result. The Nevada
Supreme Court correctly declined to consider a defendant’s potential
deportation after a domestic battery conviction on the grounds that
such a consequence is “not relevant because [it does] not reflect a
determination by the Nevada Legislature that first-offense domestic
battery is a serious offense.”260 It is the federal government, not the
Nevada legislature, that attached potential immigration
consequences to a possible conviction for a Nevada offense.261
Accordingly, those federal consequences should not be considered
when determining the relative severity of the Nevada offense.
Conversely, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, held that “the Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury
trial if he is charged with a deportable offense, even if the maximum
period of incarceration does not exceed six months.”262 In so doing, it
failed to recognize that deportation “should not be taken into account
because it is a penalty that results from a congressional enactment
and is not part of the penalty designated by the legislature that
created the offense, in this case, the Council of the District of
Columbia.”263 The court instead mistakenly focused on the fact that
Congress “is the only legislative body that can prescribe the penalty
of removal for a criminal conviction.”264 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals further concluded, without much reasoned
explanation, that there “is no reason grounded in the purpose of
Blanton’s penalty-based analysis to exclude from Sixth Amendment
consideration the serious penalty of removal that attaches to a
criminal conviction, and to which the accused is exposed, because it
has been imposed by Congress rather than the local legislature.”265
There is, in fact, a reason: Blanton instructs that relative severity is
viewed from the perspective of the legislature that adopted the
offense, not from the perspective of the legislature that imposes the
sanction.266
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 319 P.3d 602, 605 (Nev. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1260 (D.C. 2018).
Id. at 1257.
Id.
Id. at 1258.
Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541–42 (1989).
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The New York Court of Appeals made a similar misstep when it,
too, recently held that a defendant charged with an otherwise petty
offense is nonetheless entitled to a jury trial when facing the risk of
deportation.267 The New York Court of Appeals accurately observed
that “deportation or removal is a penalty of the utmost severity.”268
But it mistakenly concluded that “it is not fatal to defendant’s claim
that the penalty of deportation or removal from the country is
imposed as a matter of federal, rather than state, law.”269 According
to the New York Court of Appeals, the “salient fact is that a legislative
body authorized to attach a penalty to a state conviction has
determined that the crime warrants the onerous penalty of
deportation. That New York State could neither designate nor
effectuate this specific penalty does not make it any less onerous.”270
While the fact that removal is authorized by federal law does not
make deportation less onerous on the defendant, it does—under
existing Supreme Court precedent—make the sanction immaterial
for purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right. Like the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the New York Court of Appeals
concentrated on whether deportation is severe (it is) and incorrectly
disregarded whether deportation was imposed by the legislature that
adopted the offense (it was not).
With respect to federal prosecutions where a conviction could
lead to deportation or other immigration consequences, there is no
separate sovereign problem. There is, however, another issue that
precludes immigration consequences from being considered. Because
immigration consequences potentially apply only to noncitizen
defendants, they are not a penalty that is uniformly applied across all
defendants. As a result, they should not be considered for purposes
of determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial, because
they do not reflect how Congress views the relative severity of any
deportable offense. Under existing doctrine, “when determining the
right to a jury trial, [courts] are concerned with the seriousness of the
offense, rather than with the impact of a conviction on an individual
defendant.”271 Accordingly, courts should “consider only those
consequences that apply uniformly to all persons convicted of a
particular offense.”272

267. People v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168, 178 (N.Y. 2018).
268. Id. at 175.
269. Id. at 179; see id. at 180 (“Inasmuch as federal deportation will almost
invariably flow from certain New York state convictions, we see no persuasive
reason to exclude it from the constitutional inquiry of whether the penalties of a
crime are severe enough to warrant extending the protections of a jury trial.”).
270. Id. at 179.
271. Derendal v. Griffith, 104 P.3d 147, 154 (Ariz. 2005).
272. Id.
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Sex Offender Requirements

As for collateral consequences imposed on sex offenders, those
should be eligible for consideration, so long as they are imposed by
the same sovereign prosecuting the offense. Every state and the
federal government have sex offender requirements for qualifying
offenses, and for prosecutions where the jurisdiction prosecuting the
offense would also be the offense imposing sex offender registration,
the defendant should be constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.273
Sex offender registration requirements, moreover, are applied
uniformly across defendants.274
This is another area where courts have nonetheless reached
conflicting results. The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, has
correctly held that sex offender registration is a relevant penalty for
determining whether a defendant has the constitutional right to a
jury trial.275 Meanwhile, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
has incorrectly held that sex offender registration and related
requirements imposed by the same sovereign prosecuting the offense
should not be considered when deciding whether the defendant has
the right to a jury trial.276
3.

Firearm Prohibitions

As for firearm prohibitions, they typically apply uniformly so
they should not be excluded on that basis. The main question here is
whether the jurisdiction prosecuting the offense is the same as the
one that would impose a firearm prohibition. As noted, the federal
government imposes a firearm prohibition for all domestic violence
misdemeanor offenses.277 But state prosecutions for such offenses
should not consider that potential federal firearms ban because the
penalty is imposed by a separate sovereign—namely, the federal
government.278 If, however, the federal government is prosecuting
273. At least two courts have held, correctly in my view, that potential sex
offender requirements imposed by a separate sovereign upon conviction—for
example, by the defendant’s resident jurisdiction after a conviction by a different
jurisdiction—should not be the basis for triggering a right to a jury trial. See Ivy
v. United States, No. 5:08-CR-00021-TBR, 2010 WL 1257729, at *3–4 (W.D. Ky.
Mar. 26, 2010); Rauch v. United States, No. 1:07-CV-0730 WMW, 2007 WL
2900181 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007). These decisions correctly observe that sex
offender requirements imposed by a separate sovereign do not necessarily reflect
the views of the jurisdiction that adopted the offense of potential conviction.
274. See, e.g., Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 540–41 (Ariz. 2008).
275. Id. at 543.
276. Olafisoye v. United States, 857 A.2d 1078, 1083 (D.C. 2004).
277. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., State v. Woolverton, 371 P.3d 941, 944 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016)
(“Woolverton notes that federal law prohibits domestic-violence offenders from
purchasing firearms. But the existence of a federal statute says nothing about
how the Kansas Legislature views the offense [of misdemeanor domestic
violence], and we look to the punishments it has established to determine the
seriousness of the offense.”); Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 319 P.3d
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the qualifying offense, then the federal firearms ban should be
considered.279
Similarly, if the state has its own firearms prohibition for
qualifying misdemeanor offenses, as many states do, then a state
prosecution that could potentially lead to a state-imposed firearm ban
should be considered. Interestingly, whether a potential firearms
prohibition triggers the right to a jury trial has been the most
extensively litigated collateral consequence.280 And, once again, this
is an area where courts have reached conflicting conclusions.281
4.

Disqualifications from Public Benefits

With respect to disqualifications from public benefits, whether
such a consequence should be considered here depends on the
particular consequence at issue. If it is imposed by the same
sovereign and it applies uniformly across defendants, then it should
be considered. If, however, it is imposed by a separate sovereign—
such as a federal disqualification imposed after a state conviction—or
if it is not imposed uniformly across all defendants convicted of the
pertinent offense, then it should not be eligible for consideration.
C.

Incorporating Collateral Consequences

Having determined which collateral consequences are eligible for
consideration—sex offender requirements, some firearm prohibitions,
and some disqualifications from public benefits—the next step is to
decide which potential sanctions, if any, are sufficiently severe to
trigger a defendant’s right to a jury trial. Recall that the line dividing
serious offenses from presumptively petty offenses for purposes of the
constitutional right to a jury trial is six months of potential
imprisonment.
And further recall that potential collateral
consequences should be “viewed in conjunction with the maximum
authorized period of incarceration” in order to determine whether
they collectively “reflect a legislative determination that the offense
in question is a ‘serious’ one.”282 For the reasons discussed below, sex
offender registration and most firearm prohibitions should trigger a
defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial, while disqualifications
from public benefits should typically not trigger a jury trial right.

602, 605 (Nev. 2014) (holding that the federal firearm ban for persons convicted
of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense is irrelevant because it was Congress
that enacted the firearm prohibition, not the applicable state legislature).
279. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Jardee, No. 4:09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242, at *2–4 (D.N.D. Feb.
12, 2010); United States v. Combs, No. 8:05CR271, 2005 WL 3262983, at *2–3 (D.
Neb. Dec. 1, 2005); United States v. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1318 (N.D.
Okla. 2001).
280. See Crane, supra note 10, at 810, 810 n.163.
281. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
282. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989).
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Because sex offender requirements are the functional equivalent
of more than one-year imprisonment, they should trigger a
defendant’s constitutional right to demand a jury trial. The Arizona
Supreme Court correctly held as much when it recognized, contrary
to the conclusion of other courts, that “the potential of sex offender
registration reflects a legislative determination that [the defendant]
has been charged with serious crimes.”283 In support of its finding
that sex offender registration was sufficiently severe to warrant a jury
trial, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the obligations and
restraints imposed on convicted sex offenders, such as the wealth of
information the offender must provide upon his release, the duty to
“notify law enforcement within seventy-two hours of any move or
change of name,” and the “widespread publicity [that] accompanies
sex offender registration.”284
As for firearm prohibitions imposed by the same sovereign, those
potential sanctions should also typically trigger a defendant’s
constitutional right to a jury trial. Because firearm prohibitions are,
in my view, the functional equivalent of somewhere between one day
and six months imprisonment, the defendant should be
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial any time a firearm prohibition
is paired with a potential term of imprisonment.285 This runs
contrary to the position of most courts that have considered the
issue.286 Those decisions, however, were all issued before the
Supreme Court’s opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago,287 which
held that a person’s right to bear arms was a “fundamental” right.
Those decisions should be revisited in light of McDonald and, for the
reasons set forth earlier, a defendant facing a lifetime firearm
prohibition should have a constitutional right to a jury trial.288
283. Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 543 (Ariz. 2008). But see, e.g., Olafisoye
v. United States, 857 A.2d 1078, 1084 (D.C. 2004) (holding there is no
constitutional right to a jury trial for potential sex offender registration).
284. Fushek, 183 P.3d at 542–43.
285. If, however, there is no threat of potential imprisonment upon conviction,
then the possibility of a firearm prohibition alone should not trigger a defendant’s
constitutional right to a jury trial.
286. See United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that potential firearm prohibition is not sufficiently severe to render
charged offense “serious” and therefore trigger the constitutional right to a jury
trial); United States v. Jardee, No. 4:09-mj-091, 2010 WL 565242, at *4 (D.N.D.
Feb. 12, 2010); United States v. Combs, No. 8:05CR271, 2005 WL 3262983, at *3
(D. Neb. Dec. 1, 2005). But see United States v. Smith, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1316,
1317 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (holding “that a lifetime prohibition on the possession of
a firearm is a serious penalty which entitles a Defendant to a jury trial under the
6th Amendment”).
287. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
288. Courts denying a defendant a jury trial have also relied on 18 U.S.C.
§921(a)(33) when concluding that the federal firearm prohibition does not render
an offense “serious” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Section 921(a)(33)
provides in pertinent part that a person shall not be deemed to have been
convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” and therefore shall not
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As for disqualifications from public benefits that are imposed by
the same sovereign that is prosecuting the offense, those
consequences of conviction—while eligible for consideration—
typically should not trigger the constitutional right to a jury trial. In
Blanton, for example, the Supreme Court held that a ninety-day
suspension of a driver’s license did not render an otherwise petty
offense “serious” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.289 While some
disqualifications may be sufficiently severe to trigger a jury trial
right, those should be considered truly exceptional, as it will be
unusual for such disqualifications to infringe on a defendant’s
constitutional liberty interests to a degree approximating several
months of imprisonment.290
In sum, offenses that might lead to sex offender registration or
extended firearm prohibitions—if such consequences are imposed by
the same sovereign prosecuting the offense—should trigger a
defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
For far too long, criminal procedural entitlements have been
distributed according to an outdated model, where heightened
procedural protections are allocated based only on the sanction of
imprisonment. That model has not persisted because it is legally
required, nor has it persisted because it leads to just or, for that
matter, sensible outcomes. But it has persisted nonetheless. If
be deemed to have been convicted of an offense that prohibits possession of a
firearm in the future, unless his case was tried by a jury or he knowingly waived
his right to a jury “in the case of a prosecution for an offense . . . for which a
person was entitled to a jury trial in the jurisdiction in which the case was tried.”
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2012). “The statute’s express language,” the Eleventh
Circuit explained in Chavez, “conveys Congress’ recognition that some domestic
violence offenses do not carry with them the entitlement to a jury trial even
though a conviction results in the prohibition of firearm possession.” Chavez, 204
F.3d at 1314. While that observation is correct as far it goes—some jurisdictions
will not afford defendants a right to a jury trial for offenses that qualify as a
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”—it does not mean that federal
defendants facing a federal lifetime firearms ban should be deprived a right to a
jury trial. Section 921(a)(33) simply recognizes that some jurisdictions, such as
state jurisdictions, may not provide a jury trial right for such offenses. And as
explained in the previous Subpart, the federal firearms prohibition should not
trigger a right to a jury trial in a state prosecution. See supra Subpart V.B.
289. Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–44 (1989).
290. One such “exceptional” case may be the penalty at issue in Richter v.
Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1990). In that case, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that a fifteen-year driver’s license revocation was sufficiently severe to
render the offense “serious” for purposes of the constitutional right to a jury trial.
Id. at 1204 (observing that “[r]evocation of a license to operate a motor vehicle
very often can work a substantial hardship on its holder” and that a “15-year
license revocation, considered together with the maximum six month prison term,
is a severe enough penalty to indicate that the Nebraska legislature considers
third-offense DWI a serious crime”).
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nothing else, this Article seeks to spark a broader conversation about
how to chart a different course—one that aligns the allocation of
criminal procedural protections with the indisputable reality that
collateral consequences play a central role in our criminal justice
system.
As demonstrated by Part IV (incorporating collateral
consequences into the constitutional right to counsel) and Part V
(same for the constitutional right to a jury trial), a path forward—one
that is feasible and largely consistent with existing doctrine—is
readily available. And the framework developed here is not limited
to those two constitutional rights. It can be applied by courts and
legislatures to all procedural entitlements that are currently
distributed unevenly across defendants, such as the right to a grand
jury, the right to a preliminary hearing, and rules regarding
increased discovery.
It is now well accepted that collateral consequences have a
tremendous impact on criminal defendants and are integral to the
criminal justice system. It will eventually become accepted that the
procedural protections afforded to defendants should take these
realities into account as well. As courts and legislatures increasingly
undertake the important project of incorporating collateral
consequences into criminal procedural entitlements, this Article
establishes a pathway for doing so in a manner that is theoretically
coherent, doctrinally consistent, and practically feasible.
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